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I. FRESH LI<JH"t l=ROM tHE NEWLY AVAILABLE BRITISH ARCi-'UVES
This paper is an early fruit of the recent liberalisation of the former resti'ietions
on open access to the British archives. In February 1966 the so-called fifty-year rule
was sufficiently relaxed to allow scholars to study in one block the records of the eight
year period frorn the beginning of the First World War to the end of the Washington
Conference. Then in January 1968 the British government narrowed the "access gap"
between the British and American regulations by adopting a thirty-year rule.
Many historians are justifiably sceptical about the amount of fresh light which
newly opened archives can throw upon the general appearance of recent diplomatic
history. Undoubtedly the excitement and the sense of authenticity which such material
induces in research scholars can all too easily result in myopic and astigmatic views
rather than in clear-sightedness. Mter all, the foreign policies of modern states,
particularly those of democratic states, can only be implemented with a large degree
of openness, and while diplomacy might in many respects remain secret, the more
important aspects of international relations cannot normally be concealed for very
long. The visible areas of the diplomatic icebergs are generally large enough for astute
contemporary analysts to gauge the breadth and depth, if not the exact shape, of the
matter lying concealed beneath the surface. It is in full consciousness of this general
·limitation on the newness of the newly available documents that the paper argues
that the recently exposed record of British diplomacy from 1914 to 1922 should lead
to important modifications in the standard accounts of Far Eastern international
relations in this period.
263
During these highly eventful years of what Winston Churchill was later to describe
as the World Crisis, the British ship of state threaded a hazardous course through such
a large field of icebergs that it is not surprising that the best informed cabinet ministers,
as this paper illustrates in Section 3, failed to perceive some of them clearly. At the
same time, those unofficial observers of Far Eastern affairs who did not become
equally preoccupied with the European war were handicapped by unprecedented
restrictions on their sources of information. Admittedly the wartime censors of the
British press never succumbed to. the degree of cautious anxiety which inspired the
government of William Morris Hughes to prosecute an Australian Labour politician
who publicised the Twenty-One Demands in an effort to frighten the somewhat
Japanophobic electorate into defeating a referendum proposal to introduce conscrip-
tion for overseas military service. Nevertheless, disquieting news cables from the Far
East were severely handled by Whitehall officials; and efforts were made, not only to
stem unwelcome articles at their source, but to propagate news of a more rosy colora-
tion. "If we had been able to get rid of him out of China", wrote Sir Walter Langley,
an Assistant Und~r-Secretary for Foreign Affairs in reference to the celebrated
journalist and author "Putnam Weale" (Bertram Lennox Simpson), "we should have
done so long ago. But experience has shown that abortive proceedings are the worst
mistake from the point of view of His Majesty's Government and the best possible
advertisement for anyone in P.W.'s position."l Generally, moral pressure on news-
paper owners proved more effective. The Daily Telegraph discontinued the services
of "Putnam Weale", while the Times, under the control of Lord Northcliffe, to-
gether with his mass circulation Daily Mail, engaged in patriotic self-censorship.
In March 1916, the Times foreign editor enquired of his Peking correspondent
"if the British communities in China cannot see that all this newspaper abuse of the
Japanese (by English-language journals in China) is injurious to British interests and
likely to do great harm."2 As the long-serving British Minister in Peking, ,Sir John
Jordan, complained in late 1918, "except for the Manchester Guardian for which I
have no special admiration otherwise, there is hardly a newspaper in England that
has published a true account of Far Eastern affairs during four years of war."3
Successive Foreign Secretaries also profited from Parliament's over-riding concern
with the European struggle to stifle discussion of Far Eastern questions. In this way
they succeeded in avoiding a major debate on this subject for eight years; and as late
as June 1921, Mr. Neil Maclean, M.P., was able to complain that the only interested
legislature which had not now debated British Far Eastern policy was the British
House of Commons.1 Awkward parliamentary questions during these years were
handled in the first instance by private appeals to members to withdraw them from
the notice paper in the national interest; questions regarded by the Foreign Office as
"mischievous" were evaded either by peremptory refusals to answer at all or, as is
shown by a comparison between the initial Foreign Office minutes on a question and
the suggested answer, by half truths. All this sedulous management of pre'ss and
parliament was backed by the skill and· vigour of new propaganda agencies who
succeeded in whitewashing the black and grey aspects of Far Eastern affairs so
effectively that even preoccupied cabinet ministers themselves, as shown in Section 3,
became, in part, the victims of their own efforts to maintain wartime public morale.
Although informed public discussion of Far Eastern questions gradually revived
in the early post-war years, by that time some of the central diplomatic issues of the
war period had either ceased to be important or no longer appeared important. In
these circumstances there was very little public pressure on the government to reveal
its wartime concerns about questions which now seemed distant in time as well as
in place. Indeed, there was every reason for the post-war generation to assume that
the wartime government had been as uninvolved in Far Eastern affairs as the published
records suggested. Moreover, the post-war cabinet was not only disposed to minimise
some major wartime issues, but they had current reasons for not wishing the records
of these to become exposed (see Section 2).
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In this way, the British government's grave concern about accelerating Japanese
economic penetration of India and Japanese implication in Indian revolutlOnary
conspiracies has never appeared to post-1919 historians as a paramount issue in
British wartime policy, even though both cabinet and Foreign Office documents
clearly indicate that this was so. The fact that these apparent Japanese threats seemed
to have disappeared with the Allied victory in 1918 explains but does not justify the
tendency of post-war cabinet ministers to believe that such dangers had never really
existed in a serious way. It certainly no longer justifies interpretations of Far Eastern
international relations during the First World War which emphasize questions that
seemed important in the perspective oflater decades at the expense of problems which
the British saw as central issues at the time. Moreover, these wartime documents give
a dramatic emphasis to the firm conclusion of recent studies of early twentieth century
British documents that India was the cardinal point of imperial policies and strategy
conceived in Whitehall.
While the principal objective of this essay is to expose the central role of British
Indian interests in British Far Easternpolicy during the First World War (Sections
5-9 are devoted to this purpose), the full complexion of British policies cannot be
represented so simplistically. The image of their pluralistic and inconsistent aspects
is inescapably reflected in the overall structure of the paper, which devotes the next
three sections to setting the perspective in which the Indian questions must be seen.
The first of these deals briefly with Anglo-American relations in the Far East. Its
insertion at this key position in the paper is aimed at clearing away the distorted
images of British policy which have been projected from thirty years of examining
Far Eastern international relations through State Department lenses. Despite the
great skill of outstanding diplomatic historians like A. W. Griswold in drawing some
accurate inferences about British policies from the manner in which they were reflected
in American documents, a great deal of the policies and activities of the four major
Far Eastern powers-Japan, Britain, Russia and France-was scarcely reflected in
American documents at all. For this reason the role of the United States, and the
issues which interested the United States, have loomed as disproportionately large in
the standard histories of the Far East for this period as they used to appear in histories
of nineteenth century China before historians like Mary Wright demonstrated that
Elgin, Alcock and Wade were far more important in the diplomacy of the 1860's
than Seward and Burlingame.
A much knottier historiographical question than this is why the memoirs of Sir
Edward Grey and Lloyd George and the standard biography of Arthur Balfour by
his niece have nothing to say about the Indian issues which the wartime documents
stress so much. In Section 3 an attempt is made to resolve this problem in the light
of the manifest divergence between the better informed, yet more regiona1ised,
perspectives of British departmental specialists and the somewhat wishful, though
worldwide, perspectives of cabinet ministers, who had already begun to weigh the
value of British interests east of Suez against the diplomatic risks involved in defending
them without the requisite power to achieve this unilaterally. In large part this dualism
in British attitudes towards the Far East was a response to the increasingly unrepressed
dualism in Japanese external policies, which has been well analysed in recent studies
by Marius Jansen and Hilary Conroy.5 The coexistence of two inconsistent Japanese
policies resulted at one level in those superficial manifestations of Japan's loyalty to
her obligatiops under the Anglo-Japanese Alliance which were so gratifying to British
cabinet ministers and at another level in the undercurrents of hostile behaviour which
preoccupied the permanent officials of the Foreign Office, India Office, War Office
and Admiralty. As is shown in Section 4, Anglo-Japanese relations began to deteriora te
rapidly within a year of the second renewal of the Alliance in 1911. This was largely
due to the apparent failure of a policy of imperialist collaboration with Great Britain
to ensure the prospects of a rapid expansion of Japanese interests on the mainland of
Asia either in the Latin American pattern of investment imperialism or in the British
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Indian pattern of political and military penetration. If the obstruction of British vested
interests could not be moved by agreement, an alternative course of action was to
undermine the foundations of the British Empire in Asia. In this way, the Indian
questions, which this paper highlights, developed mainly out of Anglo-Japanese
rivalry in China: even those Japanese who assisted the Indian revolutionaries most
actively saw this work as an extension of their more immediate mission in China.
Except for the China lobby, whose hitherto disproportionate influence in Westminster
had been reduced to scale by the more acute sense of priorities resulting from the war,
the British saw the conflict with Japan the other way round. East Asia for them was
the outpost of a commercial and investment empire based in Southern Asia. Whether
the preservation of the main empire called for the abandonment or rearguard defence
of this outpost was a fundamental problem involved in the Indian issues discussed
in the last four sections of the paper.
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2. THE DISTORTIONS IN AMERICAN DOCUMENTARY
PERSPECTIVES
In the fifty years since the First World War, the unavailability of the British
records together with a massive American documentation have established a text-book
pattern of Far Eastern international relations in which British wartime policy appears,
very plausibly, as a virtual hiatus. Although this hiatus undoubtedly did exist for
most members of the British cabinet, the recently opened documents reveal an intense
undercover struggle between Great Britain and her equivocal ally, Japan, which by
1916 had forced the Foreign Office, despite an ardent desire to postpone the matter
until the end of the great European war, into a troubled reappraisal of British Far
Eastern policy. The dimensions of the conflict, which concerned, above all, a Japanese
threat to British economic and political supremacy in India were successfully concealed
at the time not only from the English-speaking public but also from the governments
of the United States and the self-governing dominions. Subsequently the vastly
changed diplomatic situation of the nineteen-twenties made both British and Japanese
governments even more anxious to keep this inside story of their wartime relations
buried in the archives.
In 1919 the Japanese wer~ forced to suppress a serious nationalist rebellion in
Korea, and since they attributed this, with some justification, to the influence of Anglo-
Saxon missionaries, they did not wish to focus British attention on Japanese colonial-
ism by pursuing their recent policy of aiding and abetting revolutionary nationalism
in India. On the contrary, by greatly modifying their support for Indian nationalism
they educed from the British government a consciously parallel policy of discouraging
British support for the Korean nationalist exiles. On 29 April 1922, the future prime
minister of South Korea, Dr. Syngman Rhee, wrote a letter to Mr. Llew Williams,
the secretary of the London Friends of Korea Society which was transmitted through
Sir Robert Newman M.P. to the British Prime Minister. When this was referred to the
Foreign Office, that department's Japanese expert, F. Ashton-Gwatkin advised that
"no good end can be served by giving any encouragement whatever to Dr. Rhee and
his party ... any encouragement given to them by British people will merely serve
as an excuse to the Japanese to encourage anti-British movements in India and
elsewhere."6
Moreover, the collapse of the German and Russian empires temporarily weakened
Japan's diplomatic situation. Confronted now by a more militant American hostility,
which was backed for the first time by a naval challenge she could not meet, Japan
was in no position to antagonise the victorious British Empire. The threat ofdiplomatic
isolation forced the Japanese to give tacit recognition to the British economic mono-
poly in India. For the next decade, at least, they concentrated on their own mono-
polistic avenues of expansion in Korea, Manchuria, and China, diverting their
attention away from their recent challenge to the British economic domination of
India, which had aroused in the British administration of that country the same
pathological fears which the previous advances of the Russian Empire had always
excited.
The British government, for its part, had many reasons to pigeonhole wartime
grievances against Japan. Although the Government of India's pent-up animosity
against the Japanese led it to urge that Japan's implication in seditionist and German
conspiracies against British India should be laid before the Versailles Peace Confer-
ence,7 the Home Government was moved by larger considerations. It was a cardinal
point in British Far Eastern policy to attempt to allay rather than to excite North
American and Australasian fears of Japan. How the Home Government's not un-
founded concern that Australia's immature and racialist external outlook might
undermine the foundations of imperial policy led it to conceal the full complexion of
Anglo-Japanese relations from the dominion government has been described else-
where. 8 In their relations with the much better informed American government, the
British were not encouraged by what Macleay9 described as the "sentimental rather
than practical"lo Far Eastern policy of the United States to be much more frank.
After British intelligence had infiltrated and broken open the worldwide Indian
revolutionary conspiracy, with its main centres in Shanghai, Yokohama, Berlin and
San Francisco, the British Government had been forced to put diplomatic pressure
on the United States to take action against the movement on its own territory; but in
doing this they had taken care not to implicate the Japanese any further than the
evidence necessary to convict the fifteen Indians, eleven Germans and five American
citizens who were sentenced in the dramatic Hindu Conspiracy Trial in San Francisco
in 1917-1S,u Indeed the British Government rejected a scheme proposed by their
principal double agent, George Vincent Kraft (whose betrayal of the German Secret
Service they had purchased for £15,000) to expose the connections of the Japanese
Minister for the Interior, Baron Goto Shimpei,12 with the German-Indian and German
Mexican schemes on the ground that it might undo the improvement in American
attitudes to Britain's Far Eastern ally which had resulted from the 1917 Ishii mission
to the United States.13
Contrary to the rather wishful attempts of some historians to trace the roots of
more recent Anglo-American co-operation in the Far East back into the early decades
of the twentieth century, no politician or official with influence on the formulation
of British Far Eastern policy advocated frank co-operation with the Americans until
Sir John JordanI4 did this unequivocally in a series of historic communications in
late 1915, documents which were regarded by the Foreign Office both at the time and
subsequently as a turning point in British diplomacy in East Asia.15 Even then, it was
the equally influential minutes on these documents by Ronald Macleay, head of the
Foreign Office's Far Eastern Department and Foreign Secretary Balfour's principal
expert at Versailles, which set the course which British diplomacy was to take towards
the American Far Eastern policy for the next three years:
It would appear to be unwise for us to take the initiative in advocating a policy
such as Sir John Jordan recommends until we know exactly what the U.S, govern-
ment has in mind and how far they are prepared to go ... it seems desirable that
we should at the Peace Conference leave the task offorcing the Japanese door in
this manner to the United States delegates before we commit ourselves to the
acceptance of the new American policy in China, so that, in. the event of the
United States Government failing to bring Japan into line, we shall not incur
the risk of antagonising Japan to no purpose by supporting a policy directly
opposed to her interests.Io
Foreign Secretary Balfour, the Cabinet's strongest advocate of trans-Atlaritic
co-operation, while agreeing "in principle" with Jordan's proposals, thought Macleay's
criticisms of them "very able",17
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In the perspective of later events it may seem only logical for the British to have
welcomed the growing American initiative in the Far East long before 1919. Such an
assumption underlay the myths that the British Government supported or even
promoted the American annexation of the Philippines and the promulgation of the
Open Door Notes,18 However, British policy was too pragmatic to build on the un-
certain prospect that the United States might steadily move in to re-establish the
principle of international co-operation in China. Even when Japan was exploiting
Europe's preoccupation with the Great War, the British sought to avoid rather than
encourage the American initiatives, which in their view merely antagonised Japan
without restraining her. The failure of British attempts during the second half of 1916
to reconstitute the Consortium, with American capital buttressing Yuan's successors
in the same way as British loans through the Consortium had enabled Yuan himself
to pacify the country and crush Sun Yat-sen's Japanese-backed Second Revolution
of 1913,19 had once again confirmed the British in their view that co-operation with
the United States in the Far East was not a viable alternative to a policy of conciliating
Japan. 20 Consequently, instead of looking forward to the prospect of American
support in order to avoid making concessions to Japan, Cabinet decided on 5 February
1917 that "the possible entry into the war of the United States increased the necessity
of an early decision in regard to Japan and Shantung and the occupied islands north
of the equator in order to avoid negotiations on the subject with another power."21
During the first three years of the war, this British resolve not to aggravate the
Far Eastern situation by making the United States aware of the full extent of the
deterioration in Anglo-Japanese relations since 1911 had been reinforced by the ill-will
engendered by American neutralist policies and by the suspicion that jealous American
investors might be using "holier than thou" Wilsonian principles as a cover to displace
the established British financial pre-eminence in China. An apparent example of this
was the contract secured by the American Siems and Carey Corporation to finance the
construction of a network of railways in China, portion of which encroached upon
existing British railway concessions in the Yangtse region. 22
This feeling had found, perhaps, its most concrete expression in early 1917, when
the colonial authorities in Malaya were authorised to prohibit further foreign invest-
ment in the rubber industry for the duration of the wartime restrictions on British
capita1. 23 In this case, however, there had been far greater concern about the strategic
implications of the growing Japanese acquisition of plantations than about the
activities of the big American rubber companies. Similarly the British efforts through-
out the second half of 1916 to reconstitute the consortium on the foundation of
available American capital, though primarily designed to avert precisely what was to
happen in China as a result of the notorious Japanese Nishihara loans of 1917-18,
had been partially motivated by the spectre of a partnership of the two isolated parties
in China's foreign-dominated economy-American capital and the industry and
growing expertise of the German community, who in the last decade had dealt a heavy
blow to the complacency and established dominance of Britain's Old China Hands.
In 1915 a Board of Trade mission to China was very impressed by German commercial
successes and very critical of the British mercantile community.24
These fears of an American-German economic combination in China were
aroused rather than stilled by the vigorous diplomacy of the American Minister,
Paul Reinsch,25 whose pro-Chinese and anti-Japanese attitudes were suspected by
Beilby Alston (head of the Far Eastern Department 1914-16 and acting counsellor
and Charge d'affaires at the Peking Legation 1916-17) as pro-German because of
Reinsch's Gennan-American birth, his German mother-in-law and, above all, his
post-doctoral studies in Germany crowned by professorial appointments at Berlin
and Leipzig universities as recently as 1911-13.26 Although the British Minister, Sir
John Jordan, who shared Reinsch's warm Sinophile attitudes, regarded his American
colleague's diplomatic efforts with sympathy, he thought them futile without concrete
support from the United States. 27 Certainly there is nothing in Jordan's voluminous
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3. LONDON'S DUALISTIC PERSPECTIVES ON THE FAR EAST
despatches or his private letters to suggest that Reinsch either enjoyed his confidence
or played the central role in wartime diplomacy which his much-quoted memoirs have
earned him in the textbooks.28 Despite the restraints placed on Jordan by the exigencies
of the European War and by policies which be bitterly disapproved, he clearly remained
the central European figure in China until his retirement in 1920, and his experience
was later invaluable to Balfour at the Washington Conference. The fact that American
records say so little about British Far Eastern policy during the war does not validate
the hypothesis that there is little to say. In few periods can American officials have
been worse informed about what the British were thinking or doing about Far
Eastern problems.
Before the release of the British records it was not unreasonable to assume that
the United Kingdom government was so completely preoccupied with the European
War that it gave no serious attention to the Far East. As emphasized above, thirty
years of inference from the American documents appeared to confirm this assumption.
Indeed, this would have been the case if the Japanese had not become involved with
the Indian revolutionaries, if they had not taken advantage of the war to accelerate
their economic penetration of British India, and if they had pursued their ambitions
in China with sufficient diplomatic skill to avoid arousing British fears that Japan's
China policy formed part of a larger challenge to British imperial interests throughout
Asia. Not only did British officials ardently desire to defer consideration of all major
Far Eastern questions until the end of the European War, but the post-war attitudes
of senior British cabinet ministers suggest that some continued to think that Anglo-
Japanese relations had remained basically as they were in 1911. Others allowed them-
selves to become the victims of their own vigorous wartime propaganda, which had
been designed to maintain public confidence in the loyalty of the Japanese ally.29
Winston Churchill, who, as First Lord of the Admiralty, had in consultation with
Sir Edward Grey made the irreversible appeal of 6 August 1914 which brought the
Japanese into the war,30 obviously absorbed so little of the rapidly changing situation
in the Far East that in July 1921 he could suggest to Sir Eyre Crowe that Japan's
intervention had occurred at her own initiative despite British opposition. 31 The fact
that the Permanent Under-Secretary for Foreign Affairs was obliged to correct
Churchill's garbled recollection of the circumstances and implications of his own
historic decision in Far Eastern diplomacy seven years previously would be less
remarkable were it not for Churchill's recent role. As Colonial Secretary he had taken
a prominent part in the Cabinet debate of 30 May 1921 on the question of the proposed
renewal of the Anglo-Japanese Alliance and even more recently in the Imperial
Conference discussions on the same subject. It is somewhat less surprising that Lloyd
George, who had often yxcited anger and contempt in the Foreign Office over some
of his ill-informed but thoroughly opinionated essays in foreign affairs, should have
attempted to sway the balance of his cabinet's opinion with this weighty view:
Frankly he liked the Japanese. The reasons they gave very often for doing things
were quite unintelligible, and they might have no conscience, but they did stand
by those who stood by them ... Japan, on the whole, had been faithful to her
obligations. No doubt she had carried out one or two suspicious transactions,
but he could tell the Cabinet of several things done by other Powers which were
infinitely worse than anything which had been done by the Japanese. Reference
had been made to Japanese intrigues in India, but he would like to know what
would happen if we were now to drop Japan. The situation would be infinitely
worse. 32
Foreign Secretary, Lord Curzon, who had recently seen a series of Foreign Office
memoranda which plainly contradicted him, told the Cabinet that "he personally
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could not think of a single instance in which the Japanese had not carried out their
word".33 Even more striking is the concurrence in Curzon's remarkable statement of
his predecessor, A. 1. Balfour. As First Lord of the Admiralty in 1916 and Foreign
Secretary from 1917 to 1919, Balfour had had first-hand knowledge of the wartime
difficulties with Japan. The sole dissentient from this Cabinet whitewashing of recent
Anglo-Japanese relations was E. S. Montagu, the Secretary of State for India. It was
his recapitulation of the record of Japanese relations with the Indian seditionists and
Japan's economic penetration of British India34 which had prompted Lloyd George's
observation on this subject.
So great was the gap in 1921 between what the Cabinet clearly wanted to believe
about recent Anglo-Japanese relations and the Foreign Office memoranda on the
subject that Victor Wellesley,35 Assistant Undersecretary Superintending the Far
Eastern Department wrote a special memorandum
... to protest most emphatically against the belief-unfortunately a growing
one-that the Far Eastern Department is anti-Japanese in sentiment. The imputa-
tion implies prejudice, animus and unreasoned bias. I wish to state clearly that
we approach all questions with an absolutely open mind and in a spirit of com-
plete detachment and impartiality. Weare merely seekers after the truth. If in the
course of our search facts are brought to light, the mere mention of which-such
as atrocities-can hardly fail to invest the subject with an anti-Japanese com-
plexion, that is, I submit, not the fault of the Department. Again, if comments
are made-and I admit that some severe things have been said-the test should
be whether or not the facts justify them before the Department is convicted of
bias. I am well aware that much which has been said may have been unpalatable
but in all humility I submit that for the Department to gloss over unpleasant facts
because they do not .fit in with our political desiderata would be to arrogate to
itself an authority which it has no right to assume.
Sir C. Eliot36 need have no fear of playing the part of Advocatus Diaboli in his
efforts to explain them away. He would be doing us on the contrary a real service
in our search for truth by criticising these Memos freely, and nothing would
please me more were he to succeed in whitewashing the Japanese by proving that
the records of the Office are merely the figments ofa large number of irresponsible
and deluded persons . .. One day we might be called lipon to substantiate these
assertions by giving chapter and verse.3?
The Foreign Office's Japanese expert, F. Ashton-Gwatkin,38 who had spent the
war years in Japan and subsequently investigated Japanese activities in Malaya for
the intelligence agencies of the War Office39 made a similar protest:
Personally, I am entirely free from any animus against Japan. Like Sir Charles
Eliot, I was educated at Oxford University and at Balliol College and was there
taught to regard the phenomena of this transitory world in a spirit of balance and
detachment ... Circumstances may have now changed: but the Department
concluded that as these things had taken place in the past so they might conceivably
again take place in thefuture.4o
It should be remembered, however, that from a 1921 perspective it was not difficult
for the British cabinet to review recent Anglo-Japanese relations so magnanimously;
and given the increasing pluralism in Japanese policies after 1911 it was natural for
senior ministers to believe that the Westernized "responsible" Japanese statesmen
whom they had met-men like Ishii and Chinda-spoke for Japan rather than the
shadowy figures whom British speciali~ts encountered through intelligence channels.
For whatever Foreign Office and India Office officials might be saying about recent
Japanese behaviour and intentions, the Anglo-Japanese Alliance, as the Cabinet saw
it, had played a vital role in the defeat of the Central Powers. Becausebf it-alld this
was the point which Lloyd George in particular emphasized repeatedly-600,OOO
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Australasian troops and over 1,000,000 Indian troops had been safely sent to the major
theatres of the war. Whether this had been due, as Lloyd George himself tended to
argue, to the actual services of the Japanese navy, or as William Morris Hughes
argued, to a greater sense of security in these dominions against Japan herself, the
result was the same-a singular British triumph through a valuable diplomatic
instrument. Against this enormous British dividend from the Alliance, all that Japan
had gained were a few islands in the Northern Pacific (to which the British, perhaps
with a greater objectivity, never attached the same strategic importance as did the
Australians and Americans), and some cohcessions in Shantung, which had been won
at Japanese cost, not at the expense of the territorial integrity of China, but from the
grasp of the German imperial octopus.
Paradoxically the Cabinet's wishful thinking and self-deception about Anglo-
Japanese relations was founded on a wider appreciation of diplomatic and strategic
realities than was often shown by the Far Eastern specialists. Men like Sir John Jordan
and Sir Conyngham Greene, the wartime ambassador in Tokyo, may have had a fuller
view of Japanese policies and a clearer vision of China's future status in East Asia,
but their picture of Far Eastern diplomacy was somewhat distorted by a more
anachronistic concept of relative British power and a more idealised concept of British
purposes. Jordan's immediate reaction to the end of the European War was to telegraph
in December 1918 that it was
highly important that a strong British squadron be sent to Far Eastern waters
as soon as circumstances permit. We should no longer incur the loss of prestige
involved in leaving Colonies like Hong Kong and Singapore so largely to the
protection of Japanese ships, and the disturbed state of China renders it impera-
tive in the interests of our trade that (our) flag should be in evidence everywhere
in Chinese waters.41
This request sprang from his firm conviction that the years 1914-18 marked"only ...
a temporary eclipse of Western influence which will pass away with the end of the
European War."42 In September 1916, Greene had expressed the similar view that
"Great Britain will emerge from her ordeal by battle with enhanced prestige---an in-
estimable advantage in the Orierit-and vis-a.-vis Japan, with an immense naval and
military superiority."43 Moreover in the tradition of his great Sinophi1e predecessors,
Sir Thomas Wade and Sir Robert Hart, Jordan identified long-term British interests
and influence in China with China's own long-term interests. But in spite of the total
destruction of German naval power, the Peking minister's appeal was not gratified by
the despatch of a strong British fleet to the Far East. Even the later and long delayed
construction of a major naval base at Singapore was not designed to relocate a greater
proportion of British naval strength to the Far East but to permit a unified home-based
navy to operate in Eastern waters if diplomacy failed to avert such an undesirable
exigency.
The progressive withdrawal of British power westward from the Pacific Ocean,
which is so clear in the perspective of 1968, is dimly foreseen in the prescient realism
ofCabinet documents in the 1911-21 decade. Not only is there a realisation that the
widely extended imperial interests which had been built up in the nineteenth century
behind the shield of a supreme British navy would have to be defended in the twentieth
century by diplomacy and by a strategy of calculated risks, but there is a realisation
that attempts to achieve too much through military power would defeat their own
purpose by crippling the financial strength on which British power rested.
This sober realisation was nicely formulated in two Committee of Imperial
Defence papers submitted to the Cabinet on the eve of the Great War. In discussing
"the Probable Scales of Attack against Oversea British Ports" in April 1914, the
Cabinet Committee observed that
in the year 1906 it was fully recognised that the rise of the German, Japanese and
United States navies ... had brought about a profound change in the political
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and strategic situation throughout the world ... Were the resources of the British
Empire unlimited, it would no doubt be desirable to make every part of His
Majesty's oversea dominions secure against all possible contingencies of war.
There is, however ... a limit to the total amount that can be spent on defence ...
It has been decided that the existence of the Anglo-Japanese Alliance relieves
His Majesty's Government at the present time from the necessity of considering
the scale of attack that Japan could bring to bear on British possessions in the
Pacific. For, so long as the Japanese alliance remains operative, it is held that
not only is the risk of attack by Japan excluded from the category of reasonable
probabilities to be provided against, but that British naval requirements are
adequately met if the combined British and Japanese forces in the Pacific are
superior to the forces maintained in those waters by any reasonably probable
combination of naval powers.44
The possibility that Japan might terminate the Alliance and become hostile had
been analysed earlier in a C.LD. paper which was submitted to the 1911 Imperial
Conference with the somewhat contradictory objectives of reassuring Australia and
New Zealand of their present security against Japanese invasion and of goading them
into greater future contributions to imperial naval defence. The Committee concluded
that "in the event of an outbreak of war with Japan at a time when our relations with
a European naval power or combination of European naval powers were strained or
hostile, it was ... conceivable that the local command of the Pacific might for a period
rest with Japan until such time as British naval reinforcements could arrive from
European waters ... During that period it would no doubt be possible for Japan to
convey oversea to Australia a military force of considerable size".45 The C.LD. argued,
however, that this would be such a disastrous adventure for Japan that it was highly
improbable that she would undertake it.
(For) it is necessary to draw a clear distinction between large operations, the
success of which will depend on the power of the Japanese fleet to keep open
oversea communications with its bases for an indefinite period and hasty raids
dependent for success rather on surprise and rapidity of execution than upon the
number of troops employed. The oversea conveyance from a distant base of
operations of a powerful military expeditionary force, and the continuous supply
of such a force, when landed in hostile territory, with munitions of war, would be
possible only to a Power which was mistress of the seas and was able to destroy
or mask all the hostile ships that might at any time be in a position to interrupt
the communications of the expeditionary force. No such expedition has ever been
carried to a successful conclusion unless this condition has been fulfilled, and
some of the great military disasters ofhistory have resultedfrom afailure to secure
or retain the assured sea command which is essentialfor the prosecution ofan oversea
campaign. Until the combined fleets of our opponents were in a position to destroy
or mask all the British naval reinforcements that might be despatched to the
Pacific-that is until the fleets of Japan and her allies had succeeded in wresting
from the British navy the permanent command of the sea-it is highly improbable
that organised invasion of Australia and New Zealand on a large scale would be
attempted. 46
Having assured the dominion governments that the vital necessity to concentrate
British naval strength in European waters did not expose them to a reasonably
conceivable risk of large-scale Japanese invasion, the Committee went on to argue,
however, that the temporary command of the Pacific might conceivably encourage the
Japanese to undertake such a devastating l"aid that
the British government might be cOl1'zpelled for political reasons to detach the
requisite naval and military reiriforcements for the' protection of these Dominions,
thereby disorganising our war plans and possibly jeopardising the success of opera-
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tions in the main theatre ofwar ... The probability of such raids being undertaken
will vary inversely as the strength and efficiency of the local naval and military
forces of the Dominions. For conditions which would give a raiding force con-
siderable chances of being able to effect serious damage before being destroyed
or compelled to surrender would act as a direct incentive to such enterprisesY
It would seem reasonable to assume that the destruction of the German navy
should have freed British policy towards Japan from the calculated risks involved in
this complicated balance of diplomacy and naval strategy. Yet in June 1921 the
Committee of Imperial Defence advised the Cabinet that
Great Britain is on the whole ... in at least as weak a position to-day for opera-
tions in the Pacific as she was in 1914 ... (For although in Europe) ... the situa-
tion from a British point of view has improved in so far as there would not now
on an emergency arising be strategic objections to moving the main British fleet
to the Far East as there would have been in 1914 ... the strategical situation in
the Far East ... has deteriorated from a British point of view. The United States
of America and Japan ... already possess the second and third strongest navies
in the world and undoubtedly will in the next few years, unless further construc-
tion is undertaken in the British Empire, become the first and second naval
powers in the world ... and while the completion of the Panama Canal has from
a strategical point of view added materially to the potential strength of the United
States fleet ... the strength of the Japanese fleet has increased out ofall proportion
to what it was in 1914. Again the "capital ship" of to-day has grown in size out of
all proportion to the corresponding vessel in the years preceding the war, and
docks such as those in the Far East and Pacific, which in the years preceding
the war were capable of accommodating the largest warships can no longer be
counted on as available for use by the larger vessels in the battle fleets of to-day.
Further, owing to the introduction of oil-fuel in the Royal Navy, it is actually the
case to-day that for want of oil~fuel reserves at the ports in the Far East the main
British fleet could not under existing conditions operate in the Pacific within any
reasonable time after the outbreak of war.48
A year later, despite the diplomatic detente issued in by the Washington Naval'
Agreements, the Admiralty submitted to the Committee of Imperial Defence an even
more pessimistic analysis.
We consider the position towards Japan requires grave and urgent consideration
... In the coal era the British fleet was mobile to an extent not approached by any
other navy in the world. A widespread system of coaling stations enabled us to
move our main fleet wherever circumstances might require. Reliance upon oil,
with all its advantages, has destroyed for the time being that mobility. The
position of Japan during the next few years will be formidable. The United States,
according to Lord Beatty, can do nothing against her across the enormous Pacific
Ocean. Obviously we cannot hold Hong Kong in the event of a war with Japan.
Unless Singapore is adequately protected before it is attacked, we cannot hold
Singapore. If Singapore fell in the first two or three months of the war, the whole
of the Pacific wouldfall under the complete supremacy of Japan, and many years
might elapse before either Britain or the United States could re-enter that ocean in
effective strength.49
In considering these sombre strategic difficulties, however, the Committee of
Imperial Defence-and particularly the Treasury representative on that body-were
adamant that the solution would have to be found in diplomacy. To achieve the
security both of the heart of the Empire and of British interests in the Pacific by naval
power alone was
beyond our capabilities in these present times of financial stringency, since the
necessary outlay would defeat its own end by crippling the wealth and therefore
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the strength of the nation's resources. The utmost we can hope for in the near
future is to possess a fleet as large as that of any other single power, and even this
will tax our resources to a high degree. 50
The Treasury representative, opposing the immediate development of the Singapore
base, observed
the financial position is such that there is in my opinion no alternative but to face
such risks as maybe involved in the present conditions of our defences in the Far
East and rely on diplomacy to obviate them.
What this implied was nicely expressed by the War Department's General Staff who
commented that should
the British Empire ... find itself at war with Japan in circumstances where ...
Japan had no preoccupations as to the attitude of Russia or of the United States
and that we were in an isolated position in the Far East ... our policy (would
have) completely broken down. 51
. It is clear from these documents of the immediate pre-war and early post-war
pei'iods that the Cabinet, or more particularly its most important committee, the
C.LD., never saw the problems of Far Eastern policy during the war years, as Jordan
and Greene did, in terms of a temporary eclipse of British power in the Pacific, but
in terms of evolving a diplomacy and strategy to underpin the permanent decline of
British power in this region. Far from being abnormal, the situation from 1914-18,
in which Great Britain attempted to secure her Eastern and Pacific interests by
diplomatic manipulation of Japanese power while the fate of the entire British Empire
was balanced critically on military engagements in France and naval struggles in the
North Sea and Atlantic Ocean, was the very situation that the United Kingdom had
envisaged in renewing the Anglo-Japanese Alliance in 1911. Nor did the 1918 victory
alter this necessity to pursue British interests through diplomacy rather than power.
For in addition to the new power relationship with Japan-which arose partly from
the manner in which the European war had impoverished Great Britain and enriched
Japan and partly from the new technological factors which had made it temporarily
impossible for the larger oil-burning warships of the Royal Navy to be deployed
against modern Japanese ships operating from home bases in East Asia-senior
ministers knew full well that Lord Curzon was not raising a remote contingency in
May 1921 when he gave Cabinet this warning:
Although Russia and Germany had for the moment ceased to be great powers ...
there was no certainty that in a few yearswe should not have a regenerated Russia;
and whatever the form of the Russian government might then be, the dangers of
the past would again be revived ... With a resuscitated Russia and a revived
Germany, it might well be that in ten year's time we might be faced with a
combination of these powers in the Far East. 52
One consequence of this basic realisation of growing British weakness in the Far
East was, as we have seen, the pronounced tendency of Cabinet Ministers to believe
that Japanese policy was what British policy aimed that it should be. Because the
deployment of Japanese power from 1914 to 1918 had contributed to the total destruc-
tion of the German Empire, it was tempting to ignore the evidence which demonstrated
that this was not the goal of Japanese policy: that, on the contrary, they had desired
the war to culminate in the exhaustion and continued deadlock of the European
empires; and that their wartime efforts and animosity had been directed more against
the entrenched position of their principal imperial rivals in Asia than against their
formal German enemy.
The other consequence was the efforts in the Foreign Office, who could not ignoi'e
the steady deterioration in Anglo-Japanese relations from the Chinese Revolution of
1912 to their lowest point on the eve of the Battle of Jutland (with afresh low during
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the great German offensive in the spring of 1918), to find the diplomatic means of
conciliating or restraining Japan. In contemplation of a wide-ranging settlement with
Japan, the value of British imperial interests in China was reassessed in terms of overall
British interests and found to be the least valuable and possibly expendable if the
exigencies of the European war warranted such a sacrifice either to conciliate Japan
or to purchase her more active co-operation in the war. Despite this resigned assess-
ment, however, both the Foreign Office and the Cabinet rejected the possibility of a
major imperial settlement with Japan during the war because the active, though un-
official, Japanese support for the Indian revolutionary movement and the accelerated
Japanese economic penetration of British India aroused the fear that a Japanese
domination of China, whether it took the form of imposing a virtual protectorate on
the Chinese or offorcing them into a subservient anti-Western alliance, would threaten
the security of British rule in India.
Such a drastic outcome could not be contemplated without a radical reconsidera-
tion of British aims in the war against the Central Powers. For though historians may
never agree on a definitive scaling of the vital issues of that war, it is nevertheless clear
that the security of Great Britain in Europe, unlike that of France, could not be
isolated from the extra-European interests on which the economy of the United
Kingdom and her status as a Great Power rested. After all it was the threat of the
Franco-Russian Alliance to British imperial interests which had first driven Britain
from her splendid isolation into her alliance with Japan. Then, in 1907, it was the
threat of a German-dominated Turkey to British imperial interests in Asia which had
led Britain to the lesser evil of an imperial settlement with Russia in 1907 and sub-
sequently either inspired or partially justified the costly campaigns against Turkey,
which weakened the Entente rather than its opponents in the central and decisive
struggles of the Great War; and it was undoubtedly the extra-European foundations
of Great Britain's commerce and power which made the British navy, in Winston
Churchill's famous antithesis, a necessity, whereas the German navy was a luxury
that his nation could not tolerate.
Not surprisingly, it was the South African statesman,General Smuts, who in
August 1918 most strongly urged the British War Cabinet not to lose sight of the
extra-European issues of the war.
Undoubtedly Germany would be lost if the war continued long enough. But was
that worth our while? Our army would shrink progressively, and we might find
ourselves reduced before the war ended to the position of a second-class power
compared with America and Japan. It was no use achieving the object of destroy-
ing Germany at the cost of the position of our own Empire. From this point of
view he considered many of the items in the Foreign Secretary's programme not
as war aims to be secured in the treaty of peace, but as things that would come of
themselves in the evolution that would follow the war. His own suggestion was
that we should concentrate on those theatres where our military and diplomatic
effort could be most effectively brought to bear together ... i.e. on our weaker
enemies. 53
While it is true that senior English ministers agreed with Curzon that "even more
serious ... than the prospect of the war ending with the United States and Japan
relatively unexhausted and predominant was that of its ending with a predominant
and unexhausted Germany" ,54 the difference between the two viewpoints lay mainly
in a different assessment of what constituted the greatest threat to Britain's world-
wide position. This point emerged clearly from a Cabinet discussion at the much more
critical period, in May 1917, of the possible consequences of the conclusion of a
negotiated peace between Kerensky's Provisional Russian Republic and Imperial
Gennany. If this occurred before the arrival of an American army could change the
balance of power in Western Europe, it might demand a negotiated peace in the West
with the "consequent reorientation of our Asiatic policy which may be forced upon us
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by the possible survival after the war of the mid-European bloc" .55 For the pre-
requisites of a Western settlement-"the complete liberation of Belgium and the
evacuation of France"-could only be offered by Germany, Curzon warned his
colleagues,
while her military strength and that of her Allies is still unbroken ... at the price
of conditions which Great Britain alone would have to pay and which would
purchase the safety of our Allies by the acceptance of grave peril to the future of
the British Empire. 56
The European war might well be considered lost from the British point of view if a
negotiated peace left India---the hub of British imperial interests-as the hostage of
Germany, Russia, or Japan, or any combination of these powers.
Just as it was the Japanese threat to the British domination ofIndia which caused
the United Kingdom to reject the idea of encouraging moderate Japanese policies by
satisfying her legitimate expansionist needs at the expense of established British pre-
dominance in China, so it was also in their control of the Indian economy that British
officials believed they had found a powerful diplomatic weapon to restrain Japan.
It was the commercial attache at the Tokyo Embassy, E. F. Crowe57 who, in December
1916, first drew attention to the possibility that the dependence of the Japanese cotton
textile industry on supplies of raw cotton from India might be used as an instrument
of economic pressure, although this could prove a two-edged weapon if not wielded
with great diplomatic skill. 58 After an excited Japanese reaction to the Government
ofIndia's imposition in early 1917 of a 71 per cent import duty on cotton textiles had
demonstrated the force of Crowe's idea,59 the Foreign Office enthusiastically pursued
the general notion to contemplate what might be achieved with dominion wool,
strategic commodities in which Japan was deficient such as rubber, oil, and steel
plating for naval armament,60 and the dependence of Japanese industry on its exports
to Allied markets, which had been well illustrated by the Japanese government's
protests at the British attempt to conserve shipping by prohibiting the importation of
cotton hosiery into the United Kingdom.61 Although the threat of Indian economic
retaliation was not used against Japan during the war, Ambassador Greene, and his
successor Charge d'affaires Alston, were both instructed to use it in 1919 in an effort
to force the Japanese Government to make amends for Japanese wartime attitudes
to the Indian revolutionaries. 62
4. BRITISH IMPERIALISM IN JAPANESE DUALISTIC PERSPECTIVES
AND POLICIES
The steady deterioration in Anglo-Japanese relations, which became so marked
during the 1914-18 war, and which was accelerated or reversed according to the varying
military fortunes of the Entente, began when the ink was scarcely dry on the second
renewal of the treaty of alliance on 13 July 1911. Indeed, it is probable that the 1905
agreement, which would normally have run until August 1915, could not have been
renegotiated in 1911 and extended to 1921 if the fortunes of Sun Yat-sen had not
delayed the final fruition of his perennial conspiracies until 10 October 1911. Had one
of Sun's pre-1911 schemes escaped miscarriage, the Japanese opponents of the
Alliance, who were formidable enough as it was in the actual circumstances of mid-
1911, would have been insuperable. For the Chinese Revolution of 1911-12 completely
undermined the cautious and restrained policies which genro-dominated Japanese
governments had been pursuing in East Asia since the beginning of the century.
Broadly speaking, these governments had had to choose between two alternative
policies. One was an "idealistic" policy propagated vigorously and even violently by
the radical and reactionary nationalists and arousing varying degrees of sympathy in
in the ruling elite itself: a policy of supporting the Chinese nationalists against
Western imperialism and the semi-colonial Manchu regime. The other was a "realistic"
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policy of co-operating with the Western imperialist powers in their collective and
competitive attempts to create an exploitable modern economic infrastructure in
China. Whatever doubts the Meiji oligarchs might have had before the turn of the
century were swept away by the series of Japanese diplomatic triumphs between 1895
and 1905. Co-operation with European imperialism brought Japan the status and
prestige of a second class power; while the modernisation of the humbled Ch'ing
regime along the lines recently pioneered by the Japanese Empire itself seemed more
likely to prove beneficial to Japan than the encouragement of the more radical Chinese
nationalists, which might well lead to revolutionary repercussions within the Japanese
political system itself. This boomerang reaction was exactly what the nationalist critics
of the oligarchy hoped for. First Korea, then China, and finally Manchuria they saw
as nurseries for a regenerated Oriental society which could be transplanted back into
Japanese soil after it had been cleared of the noxious Western plantations. The in-
fluence of these nationalist idealists, particularly on the subordinate officials through
whom government policies had to operate, was already strong enough in the first
decade of the century to produce a repressed dualism in Japanese policies and even a
certain ambivalence in the most senior statesmen themselves. However, down until
the annexation of Korea in 1910, the high tide of realist policies had brought in so
many diplomatic successes to Japan that these undercurrents had scarcely disturbed
the somewhat patronising benevolence with which most English policymakers regarded
the Japanese. While Tokyo, in the first two decades of the twentieth century, was (as
Marius Jansen pointed out in his study The Japanese and Sun Yat-sen63) for Asian
nationalists what Moscow was later to become, revolutionaries like Sun Yat-sen met
with intermittent official harassment as well as unofficial succour. For this reason the
attitude of the Japanese government towards refugee Asian nationalists could be
represented internationally as being correctly liberal: like that of the British and
French governments to political refugees from Tsarist Russia, for example.
Then, in the Chinese Revolution of 1912, the Japanese suffered an unrelieved
diplomatic defeat. Unlike the British government, who observed an astute neutrality,
the Japanese government persisted in the policy of strong support for the Manchus.
The outcome was a diplomatic rift with Great Britain, the defeat of the Manchus, the
defeat of the Chinese nationalists and their Japanese sympathisers, and the accession
to power of the anti-Japanese Yuan Shih-k'ai. As a result of this debacle, the
established official policy of co-operating with the European powers to support the
central government in Peking was almost submerged by the countervailing policy,
and in the so-called Second Revolution of July 1913, the Japanese government support-
ed Sun Yat-sen and the Kuomintang in their forcible attempt to depose the autocratic
President Yuan Shih-k'ai. With strong British financial support, furnished through
the Five Power Consortium, Yuan easily crushed the rebellion; and the Japanese
government, who sent a disproportionately large punitive expedition to Nanking in
September to avenge an attack on three Japanese nationals, drew a sharp note of
protest from the British Government, reminding them of their obligations under
Article I of the recently renewed Anglo-Japanese Alliance.64
While still smarting from these defeats, the Japanese suffered two further blows
from their ally in 1914. Again by the exercise of strong diplomatic pressure, this time
on Yuan Shih-k'ai rather than on the Japanese government, the British defeated
Japanese attempts to secure major railway concessions in the Yangtse region, which
would have drained away the value of prior concessions already granted to British
interests.6s The British also rejected Japanese overtures for an economic alliance to
parallel the political alliance on the grounds that in the existing financial situation the
British would have to supply most of the capital for development in China proper,
while Japan enjoyed a share of the fruits though continuing to enjoy a monopolistic
position in Korea and Southern Manchuria.66
Nevertheless, on the eve of the war some influential Britons were having second
thoughts about the long-term wisdom of rejecting Japanese proposals for industrial
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co-operation in China. The Shanghai branch of the China Association was considering
the matter right up until the presentation of the Twenty-One Demands in early 1915
appeared to make it evident that what the British could now gracefully offer the
Japanese was either too little or too late.67 At the same time as "the Old China Hands"
were thinking again about the future of British economic relations with Japan, Beilby
Alston of the Foreign Office's Far Eastern Department returned from a period of
duty in Peking as Embassy Counsellor and Charge d'affaires so concerned about the
future of Anglo-Japanese relations in China that he sketched out a memorandum on
a possible understanding with Japan. He was obliged to put this aside during the
European crisis of August 1914, but finally submitted it to the Foreign Secretary at
the time of the Twenty-One Demands. 68 Alston never appears to have envisaged
concessions to Japan on the same scale as Sir Edward Grey vaguely contemplated in
early 1916; nevertheless, in his subsequent career this influential official continued
to display a strong inclination to be the architect of an important Far Eastern settle-
ment, which he may well have been if Grey's notions could have come to fruition.
Notwithstanding these ominous portents of 1912-14, Sir John Jordan found
himself virtually isolated on 9 August 1914, when he warned that Japan's entry into
the war "would endanger the stability of the existing regime in China to say nothing
of our political influence in this country and our prestige in Asia generally" and would
also lead to the "probable seizure by Japan of the islands lying between this country
and Australia".sD Sir Eyre Crowe, the influential Under-Secretary who was to head
the Foreign Office after the war, advised the Foreign Secretary that he was "sorry to
differ altogether from Sir John Jordan's view, which is limited to the Chinese horizon.
He does not understand what is the nature of a war on which our existence is staked."70
And although Alston and his colleagues in the Far Eastern Department had already
balanced the issue so evenly as to produce successive reversals of British policy on the
question on 3 August, 4 August, and 6 August, the telegrams from the Tokyo Embassy
were entirely reassuring.
Ambassador Sir Conyngham Greene was relatively new to Far Eastern affairs;
he had been schooled in the general Westminster benevolence towards Japan, and
consequently he accepted Foreign Minister Kato Komei's assurances about Japan's
intentions, thereby reinforcing the favourable impression which Kato had made on
Sir Edward Grey during the frank discussions about the future of Anglo-Japanese
relations which the two had had quite recently when Kato had been Japanese
Ambassador in London. It is significant that Greene's benevolence towards Japan
survived even the shock of the Twenty-One Demands, for in a private letter to Grey
on 22 August 1915, he wrote:
With Baron Kato, I never had any misunderstanding, and the only unpleasant
incident was the China Demands surprise. But I suppose no government can
afford to be unpractical in time of war: at any rate I prefer to look back upon
the episode in that light. 71
Grey's attitude was very similar; for not only did he express his regret that Kato had
been forced from office, but presented the Twenty-One Demands crisis to the Cabinet
in such a way that Prime Minister Asquith reported to the King on May 7th, that
Sir E. Grey described the serious situation which had arisen between China and
Japan. The Japanese have shown a want of frankness in keeping back some of
their demands none of which however seriously affect British interests in the Far
East. 72
Thus the British documents make it clear that British policy makers did not see .
the presentation of the Twenty-One Demands as a major turning point in Anglo-
Japanese relations until the end of 1915, when they saw them in relation to a more
general challenge to the British Empire in Asia. Greene's personal attitude towards
Japan underwent a complete reversal in six months as a result of his unsuccessful
negotiations with the Japanese government in a series of crises centred on Indian
affairs, the origins of which should now be traced.
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5. FAR EASTERN QUESTIONS IN A NEW INDIAN PERSPECTIVE
Of the two issues which formed the basis of a recriminatory document entitled
The Indian Brief Against Japan 73 which the Government of India forwarded to West-
minster in February 1919, in the expectation that the long-awaited day of reckoning
had come, the question of Japanese economic penetration into British India had
already grown into a serious diplomatic dispute between the two Far Eastern allies
before the outbreak of the First World War. Where British Indian interests were
concerned, Sir Edward Grey, in contrast to his inclinations to reassess the relations
between established British interests in China and growing Japanese interests in that
country, was disposed to take a strong line with Japan. At a Cabinet meeting on
3 February 1914, Grey supported Lord Crewe's demand that the Government of
India should be permitted to repeal the 1850 law which opened India's commerce to
worldwide competition. This action was to be taken in order that the Japanese might
be threatened with total exclusion unless they desisted from what the British claimed
was a calculated policy of driving British ships out of the Indian coasting trade with
the aid of government subsidies and other commercial methods regarded by the
British as unfair. 74 Plaintiff in the dispute was the British India Steam Navigation
Company (by then a subsidiary of the Peninsula and Orient Line) who complained
that they had been fighting a losing battle with the Nippon Yusen Kaisha for three
years, and that without intervention by the British government the whole of the
Indian coasting trade would fall into Japanese hands. Not only would this be a grave
matter from an economic point of view, they argued, but since the mercantile marine
had always furnished a valuable supplement to naval strength in time of war both in
personnel and in conversion of merchantmen to merchant cruisers, it would drastically
weaken British naval potential in Asiatic waters. The British Indian company com-
plained that in addition to the government subsidies the Japanese used underhand
methods such as advertising that their ships were managed by Japanese captains and
officers who were more likely to be friendly to Asiatic passengers than Englishmen.
Furthermore by "doctoring the tap" the Japanese had made drinking water available
at all times, whereas on British ships it was distributed only three times a day.75
Direct negotiations between the British and Japanese companies broke down
because the Japanese, though willing to withdraw from the Indian coasting trade, as
defined by them, were unwilling to surrender the right to ply the lucrative route
between Calcutta and Rangoon. 76 Burma, in the Japanese view, comprised a separate
country from India, even if administratively combined with India. The British
negotiators in the dispute were handicapped by the fear that the Japanese Government
might meet the British case by formally throwing open the coasting trade of Japan to
British ships, a concession which would'cut the ground from under their feet and at
the same time be completely negated by a nationalistic avoidance of British vessels by
Japanese shippers.?? Aware of the weakness of the British position, the Nippon Yusen
Kaisha on 9 September 1914 snubbed the British Embassy's attempt to assist in the
negotiations, informing Sir Conyngham Greene that there was no room for his
assistance. 78 In view of the European crisis, which had moved Grey to tell the India
Office that "the present juncture is inopportune for taking any step which might be
construed as an endeavour to put pressure of any kind on the Japanese government", 79
the British Foreign Office was obliged to shelve the matter. 80
In the circumstances this was an important victory for the Japanese. Indeed, the
plight of the British India Steam Navigation Company was worsened by the diversion
of forty-nine of their ships, with a total tonnage of 245,699 to the carriage of troops
and by the Royal Navy's requisition of a large number of British merchant ships in
Asiatic waters for conversion into merchant cruisers. 81 There was a grave danger,
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B.I.S.N.C. officials protested, that the Red Ensign might be completely displaced in
Indian waters by the Rising Sun. 82 British Indian interests were further aggrieved
when it became apparent that the Japanese were using British naval exigencies to
accelerate the displacement of British sea-going commerce. The Japanese, they said,
always pleaded a shortage of tonnage when they were asked to employ their merchant-
men in the carriage of essential wartime supplies on routes where they were likely to
suffer heavily from enemy action or where an entrenched commercial position for the
future was not likely to be achieved. 83 Although these protests produced no concrete
action from the British government beyond the exercise of more prudence in diverting
British merchant shipping from Asian commerce,84 the issue formed part of a more
comprehensive submission on the Japanese threat to the British commercial position
in India, which the Government of India contributed in March 1916 to the Home
Government's reappraisal of British Far Eastern Policy. 85
On the question of revolutionary Indian nationalism, the Japanese Government
appeared to be adopting a relatively co-operative line until the second half of 1915.
After a great deal of pressure from the British, the Japanese authorities in 1912
suppressed an anti-British journal entitled The Islamic fraternity edited by Baraka-
tullah, a lecturer in Urdu at the Tokyo School of Foreign Languages; and in March
1914 his lecturer's contract was not renewed. 86 Even more gratifying was the pre-
dominant role played by marines from the Japanese fleet and by volunteers organised
by the Japanese consul-general in suppressing a serious mutiny in the Indian garrison
in Singapore in February 1915. 87
Japanese nationalists were subsequently to make great capital out of this blow
to British prestige, though some of them questioned whether Japanese forces should
have been employed against the victims of British imperialism. 88 Shortly afterwards,
when the British Government asked the Japanese government to deny the use of
Japanese postal facilities to Indian revolutionary literature flowing from the United
States, the Japanese formally assented, with the escape proviso that they could not
interfere with registered mai1. 89 However, the events of 1915 not only made the
Japanese Government much less receptive to British pressure, but they encouraged
the Japanese nationalists to widen the patronage they had been giving to the Chinese
nationalists to embrace this encouraging Indian movement.
The pre-Gandhian Indian revolutionary movement has not hitherto received
much attention from historians. 90 There appear to be two causes of this neglect.
First, the success of Gandhian techniques of non-violent resistance has overshadowed
the historical significance of the revolutionaries of violence. Secondly, the successive
British concessions stemming from the Montagu-Chelmsford Report gave to Congress
nationalism a constructive and central role in the struggle for independence which
weakened interest in either the future or the history of revolutionism in India. Conse-
quently, such early post-war literature as gives some indication of the dimensions of
revolutionary nationalism has been largely disregarded because there was little
indication of just how seriously the British had regarded what was then classified as
Indian sedition. In fact the report of the Government of India's Rowlatt Committee, 91
which did stem from wartime concern with the activities of the revolutionaries rather
than from an accurate appreciation of the current situation it sought to meet, was
largely discredited after it led directly to the irrelevant Rowlatt Acts and in turn to the
Amritsar Massacre. In the same way, the account of the abortive Ghadr rising of
February 1915, given by Sir Michael O'Dwyer, the Lieutenant-Governor of the
Punjab who had crushed the movement,92 appeared exaggerated in the light of the
role which O'Dwyer played in General Dyer's action at Amritsar in 1919. However,
it is now clear from the British records that all government departments dealing with
Indian sedition during the war regarded the Indian revolutionary movement very
seriously indeed. .
The Japanese do not appear to have become directly involved with the Indian
revolutionaries until Rash Behari Bose, who organised the attempt on Viceroy
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Hardinge's life in 1912 and led the abortive Ghadr rebellion in February 1915, fled to
Japan in May 1915 on the Sanuki Maru,93 though naturally the Indian conspirators
had always made use of the safety of Japanese shipping lines and the sympathy of
Japanese mariners. The most noteworthy example of this had been the notorioUB
voyage of the Komagatu M aru on the eve of the war. In an attempt to find a loophole
in the restrictive Canadian immigration regulations or merely to inflame Indian
revolutionary sentiments against the inferior status of Indians in the British Empire,
a wealthy Sikh businessman named Gurdit Singh had chartered a Japanese steamer
to transport 372 hopeful Indian immigrants to Vancouver. Refused permission to
land, the passengers had forcibly repelled a boarding party of Canadian police and
the Komagatu 1v1aru had weighed anchor only under the threat of naval coercion.
The resentful passengers had landed back in Calcutta in October 1914 in a most
rebellious frame of mind, and many of them had participated in the abortive rising
of February 1915. 94
As soon as the British Embassy learned of the presence in Japan of two of the
most important Indian revolutionaries, Herambalal Gupta and Rash Behari Bose
(alias Thakur), Greene put tremendous pressure on the Japanese Government to expel
them from Japan in such a manner that they would fall into British hands. After two
months of tortuous negotiations, in the course of which the Embassy counsellor, Lord
Kilmarnock, at one stage made almost daily representations at the Japanese Ministry
of Foreign Affairs, the Japanese government agreed to a plan whereby the two Indians
would be expelled from Japan on an identified Japanese ship from which they would
then be taken by an intercepting British warship. H.M.S. A tlas was despatched from
Hong Kong to Yokohama for this purpose. However, the Japanese authorities made
the expulsion order known to the Indians five days in advance, with the result that
on the morning it was to take effect, 2 December 1915, they took refuge in the house
of the powerful reactionary nationalist, Toyama Mitsuru,95 which the Japanese police
surrounded but dared not enter. In the meantime, Bose and Gupta escaped through
the neighbouring house and were concealed for several months by Soma Aizo, one of
Toyama's disciples, in the loft of his bakery, while the Japanese government professed
their inability to discover the whereabouts of the wanted men. 96 As British agents
subsequently learned, the "escape" had been pre-arranged with the Japanese authori-
ties after an influential delegation which included Toyama, and Inukai Ki,97 the
leading radical nationalist parliamentarian, waited on the Premier, Count Okuma
Shigenobu. Of all the genro Okuma leaned most towards Pan-Asian nationalism, and
since that day in 1889 when one of Toyama's disciples had blown off one of his legs,98
he had been peculiarly sensitive to pressure from Toyama and the nationalist critics
of the oligarchy.
Four days after Bose and Gupta were taken under Toyama's protective wing,
Greene learned from Baron Ishii, the Japanese Foreign Minister, of Japan's insuper-
able opposition to the proposal to bring China into the war, which had been submitted
to him in a joint memorandum from the Entente ambassadors on 22 November. 99
The motives underlying this scheme were complex, especially when Russian and French
diplomacy overlaid the original British initiative, but Foreign Office discussion of the
issue during 1915 makes it clear that the principal British motive was to prevent the
continued use of Chinese territory, particularly territory in which Chinese jurisdiction
was limited by the unequal treaties, as one of the principal bases for German and
Indian revolutionary conspiracies against British rule in India.1oo This policy was
forced on the Foreign Office, despite the misgivings of the Far Eastern Department,
and despite Jordan's prediction of the consequences for Anglo-Japanese relations and
for the stability of the Chinese Republic if Japan, as was probable, decided to frustrate
the endeavour,1°1
It is unlikely that a desire to obstruct the Government of India's campaign
against seditious conspiracies played any role in the Japanese government's attitude
to China's entry into the war, for their suspicion that this could only be an Anglo-
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Chinese scheme to rob Japan of her gains of 1914-15 is understandable. Indeed, it
may well have been the vigour of subsequent British diplomacy on the seditionist issue
which encouraged the Japanese to believe that the revolutionaries might really be a
threat to British power in India, worthy of Japanese support. However, what was
particularly galling to the British about the situation in China was not only that the
German concessions in Tientsin, Hankow, and Canton and the international settle-
ment in Shanghai were such fertile ground for intrigues against India-since all large
treaty ports had colonies of Sikhs,102 who had long been in favour as garrison troops,
policemen and watchmen-but that Gennany's large share in the Boxer indemnity
enabled her to finance these intrigues from Chinese revenue, which in turn was now
mainly derived from the maritime customs duties on Allied commerce.
At all events the British move led to a major rift in Anglo-Japanese relations.
Not only were the Japanese incensed by the suspicion of an Anglo-Chinese conspiracy
against Japan, but they deeply resented the fact that their ally had entered into prior
discussions with Russia and France on Far Eastern questions and then presented the
Japanese government with a joint proposal in which they had not been a negotiating
party-a move which must certainly have recalled to sensitive Japanese the humiliating
Triple Intervention of 1895. As a result of this debacle, Grey laid down a firm policy,
which the British adhered to until the abrogation of the Anglo-Japanese Alliance at
the Washington Conference, of treating Japan as a full partner in Far Eastern affairs
rather than as an associate member of the Entente.
Japanese bitterness may be gauged from the highly dramatic personal attack
which Mr. Honda, Counsellor at the London Embassy, staged before Bedby Alston
at the Foreign Office, accusing him of being the author of the scheme.103 Shortly
afterwards the Japanese newspaper Nichi Nichi campaigned for the recall of Sir John
Jordan as a serious obstacle to Anglo-Japanese accord.104 This formed part of an
intense campaign in the Japanese press against.Great Britain and the Anglo-Japanese
Alliance,105 which was initiated late in 1914 by accusations of British cowardice during
the joint Anglo-Japanese operations against Tsingtau,106 gathered momentum in 1915
with protests that British pressure had been mainly instrumental in the defeat of
Group V of the Japanese demands on China,107 and reached its peak in the first half
of 1916. Thereafter it slowly receded after the Battle of Jutland, and more rapidly after
America's entry into the war improved Britain's military position, but revived during
the German offensive of Spring, 1918, when Prince Arthur of Connaught was sent to
Japan to bestow a British Field Marshal's baton on the Japanese Emperor as part of a
propaganda effort to improve the British image in Japan.10S
The press campaign of 1916 reached new heights after Admiral W. L. Grant109
sent H.M.S. Laurentic to patrol off the China coast-a zone assigned in the informal
operational agreement to the Japanese navy-at the very time when the British were
negotiating for extended Japanese naval assistance. Acting under printed instructions
from Grant that small Japanese steamers were especially suspect of smuggling arms
into India and carrying enemy nationals and Indian seditionists,llo Laurentic stopped
and searched six Japanese steamers between 5 February and 12 March 1916.111 On
5 February, nine Indians were taken off the Tenyo Maru and landed at Hong Kong,
where they were cleared and allowed to proceed on their way, although it was generally
believed in Japan that they had been summarily executed.ll2 On 5 March, outside
Shanghai, Laurentic, according to the Japanese ambassador's protest, fired one
blank and two ball cartridges at the Chizuken Maru and "the debris of shells
falling on her decks, feelings of great consternation were created among those
on board."1l3
The Japanese press vigorously attacked this British outrage to the Japanese flag,
and the Indian revolutionaries by now enjoying the firm sponsorship of Toyama
Mitsuru and the members of the Black Dragon Society, added fuel to the flames by
ghosting hostile articles on British rule in India, which Okawa Shumei1l4 translated
into Japanese. Under the circumstances the British government had no alternative
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but to instruct British warships to cease interfering with Japanese shipping and to
recognise the patrol of the China coast as a Japanese preserve,l15
British apprehension at the scope of Japanese intentions was heightened when the
Government of India set its cipher experts to work on telegraphic messages which the
Japanese has asked permission to transmit from a newly established Japanese consulate-
general in Yunnanfu on the British wire through Burma and Singapore. Interpolated
through a Japanese code, which they did not break, the Government oflndia experts
discovered a Cb.inese cipher, which proved to be communications between Sun Yat-sen
and the leaders of the provincial rebellions against Yuan Shih-kai's short-lived
Empire. l16 To the Government oflndia in particular, the prospect of the establishment
of Japanese sponsored governments in south-western China, if not in China at large,
was most alarming, the more so as British intelligence progressively uncovered the
liaison between the revolutionary Indian nationalists and Sun Yat-sen through Sun's
Japanese nationalist supporters. In the early months of 1916, it seemed impossible to
British officials and statesmen charged with the operation of British policy in the East
that a major reshaping of Anglo-Japanese relations could be postponed until after
the war.
6. GREY'S HALF-FORMED VISION OF AN ANGLO-JAPANESE
IMPERIAL BARGAIN
In early 1916, Sir Edward Grey saw the Far Eastern problem in these terms:
Japan is barred from every other part of the world except the Far East, and the
Anglo-Japanese Alliance cannot be maintained if she is to be barred there also
or if we are to take the German concessions in China as well as taking German
concessions in Africa and elsewhere ... I do no wish to make offers to Japan at
the expense of China, but in my opinion if we had not made it clear that we
should not bar Japan's expansion of interests in the Far East, it would clearly
have been to Japan's advantage to throw in her lot with Germany.H 7
What rearrangement of Anglo-Japanese relations in the Far East Grey envisaged
during 1916 cannot be clearly deduced from the documentary evidence, which is
fragmentary, owing to his preoccupation with European affairs and to the lack of
enthusiasm or opposition with which his Far Eastern advisers greeted his general idea.
It seems clear though that he thought in terms of recent imperialist demarcations like
the Anglo-French entente of 1904, the Anglo-Russian entente of 1907 or more
immediately the Sykes-Picot agreement of 1916. Since the Japanese knew that the
Entente had bought Italy's military assistance with territorial promises and had
sought to boost Russian resolve with the promise of Constantinople, Grey felt unable
to postpone the consideration of Japanese expansionist ambitions until the final peace
settlement.1l8 It was at his initiative that a sub-committee of the Committee ofImperial
Defence was established in August 1916 to furnish the government with
a clear idea of what increase of territory is desirable in the interests of the British
Empire and how much of the territory already taken from the enemy by Great
Britain and her Allies can be used (a) for surrender to the Allies as their share
and (b) for bargaining with Germany in the event of the Allies being unable to
impose their own final peace terms on Germany.ll°
It was along these lines that Grey had instructed Alston in February 1916 to
work up a proposal which might satisfy Japanese aspirations, repair the breach in the
Alliance, enlist greater Japanese cooperation in the war and achieve the objectives
sought in the recent attempt to bring China into the war. Alston drew up a memoran-
dum on the subject,120 and with the Foreign Secretary's approval its substance was
telegraphed to Sir John Jordan for his comments.121 In general the idea was that China
should be brought into the war with Japan's assent; Japanese aspirations in China
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could then be met with a share of German interests in that country, while China would
be compensated for her sacrifices with the remaining share of German interests, which
might be supplemented by the British retrocession of Wei-hai-wei and a substantial
loan to the Chinese government.
Jordan was outspoken in his opposition to the proposal, which
so far as Chinese co-operation is concerned seems to me quite impracticable and
to be based upon a misconception of the existing political situation in the
country. .. Rather than divide existing German concessions with Japan the
Chinese would in my opinion infinitely prefer to see them remain in the hands of
Germany. A railway or other concession held by a European power is from a
Chinese point of view a very different thing from a similar concession held by
Japan. The latter becomes an instrument of peaceful penetration and of Japanese
colonisation or a lever for obtaining preferential rights and exclusive privileges ...
In this connection it must not be forgotten that the ... "assets" which it is pro-
posed to divide are either Chinese prop~rty or at least properties over which
China already possesses sovereign rights. The retrocession of Wei-hai-wei would
offer little or no attraction to China, who would probably prefer its retention by
us as a potential counterpoise to the Japanese positions at Port Arthur and
Kiaochow on either side of the sea approach to the capital ... But if, as I regret
to learn from your telegram, the assistance of Japan is indispensable to enable us
to pull through and cannot otherwise be obtained, then I think both we and the
Russians should not hesitate to make the necessary sacrifice of our interests in
China. We in the Yangtse Valley and the Russians in Manchuria can offer her
co-operation in railway and other enterprises, and arrangements could if necessary
be made independently of China. The French might also make a similar contribu-
tion. We should naturally alienate the goodwill of China, but that is inevitable
in the circumstances. This might perhaps be minimised if Japan in return would
agree to give her support to Yuan Shih-k'ai's government against revolution.122
Grey was clearly disappointed at this response to his effort to find a solution for
a major problem in British policy, and the confidence which he had hitherto reposed
in Jordan that had made the Peking Minister the virtual source of British China
policies was greatly reduced. Although he strongly supported Jordan in the face of
Nichi-Nichi's campaign to have him recalled, Alston, whom the Foreign Secretary
might well expect to identify himself less closely with Chinese and British China
interests, was sent to Peking as Counsellor to assist Jordan and bring the Legation
into closer touch with the current Westminster assessment of diplomatic realities.123
Later in 1916 Jordan was brought home on leave, and it would appear from a private
letter from Alston to Langley124 that there was some question of retiring the sixty-four
year old diplomatist,125 At all events, Grey's successor, Balfour, did not see fit to
inform Jordan, who was actually in the United Kingdom at the time, of the British
government's promise in February 1917 to support Japan at the peace conference in
her claims to the German concessions in Shantung and Germany's island colonies in
the Northern Pacific. Nor was the Peking Legation, to which Jordan was to return
later in 1917, advised of this secret treaty.126 This failure to communicate a policy
decision of such obvious importance in the future of Anglo-Chinese relations to the
British diplomatic mission in China might conceivably be interpreted as an incredible
oversight if it were not a repetition of a similar occurrence in 1916. Not long after
Jordan had poured cold water on Grey's idea of a bargain with Japan, the Foreign
Office failed to transmit to the Peking Legation copies of two important despatches
to Tokyo (Nos. 37 and 39) in which Grey had recorded his verbal assurances to the
Japanese ambassador that Great Britain did not intend to put forward claims to any
of the German concessions in China.127
In Tokyo the now embittered Greene was also sceptical about the prospect of
moderating Japanese aspirations by sympathetic and graceful conciliation, and in a
\Y"
BRITISH FAR EASTERN POLICY 1913-19 285
private letter of February 1916 he warned Grey of the inadvisability of "cashing
Japan's war credits" before the end of the European conflict.I28 However, Foreign
Office officials who succumbed to anti-Japanese sentiments were not likely to appear
either prescient or sagacious to British Cabinet ministers, as both Greene and Ronald
Macleay, head of the Far Eastern Department 1917-18 and Balfour's Far Eastern
adviser at the Versailles Peace Conference, were to find after the war. "Macleay hates
the Japanese", Balfour advised his successor Curzon, in opposing the diplomatist's
promotion to the Berlin Embassy; and although he had "found hIm both loyal and
zealous", he "did not, however, see any special signs of diplomatic dexterity".129
After Greene's contributions to a Foreign Office Committee report on the Anglo-
Japanese Alliance in 1920, which Curzon as Foreign Secretary did not endorse and
had confined to reference files, he refused to contemplate Greene's participation in the
British delegation to the Washington Conference; nor did he show any enthusiasm
about sending Sir John Jordan,lao though he recognised that the retired official's
unparalleled grasp of China problems and his standmg with Chinese officials would
make him invaluable in negotiating with the Americans.13l
Historians can only conjecture whether Grey's undeveloped idea of a bargain
with Japan was a viable path for Anglo-Japanese relations, just as Burton Beers has
speculated on Robert Lansing's equally abortive scheme for a Japanese-American
bargain;132 but it is abundantly clear that the opposition of British Far Eastern
specialists could not have overridden what Cabinet ministers regarded as a broader
view of the problem. The opposition of the Government of India was much more
formidable, and their intervention in the 1916 debate was decisive. Quite apart from
the central importance of India to Britain's worldwide position, a series of historical
accidents placed the Government of India in an exceptionally strategic position to
influence British wartime policy in the Far East. During Grey's frequent illnesses in
1915, his ministerial role was filled by the Marquis of Crewe, the Secretary of State
for India, who in this Foreign Office role played an important part in the 1915 British
scheme to bring China into the war: this partly explams how concern for Indian in-
terests was allowed to override the sound misgivings of the Far Eastern specialists.133
On the formation of the first coalition government, Lord Crewe was succeeded at the
India Office by Austen Chamberlain, one of the most influential of Conservative
ministers. Then in mid-19l6, an official with a unique interest in Indian sedition was
appointed Permanent Under-Secretary for Foreign Affairs. This was Lord Hardinge,134
recent Viceroy of India, and the near-victim of the would-be assassin who was now
enjoying the protection and patronage of Toyama Mitsuru, with the connivance of the
Japanese Government. All of these factors added great weight to the submissions of
the Government of India when they entered the debate on British Far Eastern policy
with two crucial memoranda in March and May of 1916.135
7. ANGLOnlNDIAN PERSPECTIVES ON JAPAN
The confidence with which the United Kingdom government viewed the growth
of Japanese power within the Anglo-Japanese Alliance, had never been shared by the
Government of India: its attitudes to Japan after the Russo-Japanese war more
closely paralleled those of Australia and New Zealand. Although the 1905 renewal
had provided for the possibility of Japanese military assistance in defending the
frontiers of India against possible Russian attack, there appears to be no evidence that
the Government of India had been consulted about the insertion of this provision.136
At all events Viceroy Minto, after consultation with Lord Kitchener, advised
Westminster only one year later that it would not be advisable in the case of hostilities
"to employ Japanese troops in or through India", although they were "not, however,
prepared to say that this might never be advisable" .137 In line with this view the General
Staff recommended in 1906 that if the deployment of Japanese troops against Russia
were required, this should be in the Far East;
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to ask for assistance (in India) to ward off a single adversary would not be con-
sistent with either our dignity or our self respect. Such a request on our part
would, in fact, be interpreted and not without reason as clear proof of our
national decadence and would be highly detrimental, if not absolutely fatal, to
our prestige throughout the Asiatic continent.l38
When the treaty was renewed for the second time in 1911, reference to the security
of India was confined to the preamble; and after the events of 1915-16, the Govern-
ment of India insisted that if the treaty were to be renewed for a third time, all reference
to the possibility of Japanese military assistance to British India should be omitted.139
During the 1914-18 war, the Government ofIndia strongly opposed two fanciful
schemes proposed by British cabinet ministers-the first in late 1915 and the second
in late 1917-to invite Japanese military assistance in South-Western Asia. Since the
possibility of Japanese acquiescence in these projects was virtually negligible, they are
of historical significance mainly because they illustrate the extent to which the British
Cabinet deluded itself about Japan's role in the war. This was a delusion of consider-
able consequence, since the persistent quest for a suitable role for Japanese troops laid
the foundations for the determined conviction with which the British promoted the
Siberian intervention and the righteous self-justification with which they set out to
conceal from the suspicious American president that they, even more than the
Japanese, sought American agreement for a limited intervention as the thin end of a
wedge to facilitate a large scale deployment of Japanese troops.l4O These 1915 and 1917
proposals also reveal the wide divergence between Cabinet and British Indian attitudes
to Japan.
As late as November 1915, despite the Twenty-One Demands, Sir Edward Grey
could still suggest that Japanese troops might be sent to garrison the Indian frontier
in order to release British troops for service in Mesopotamia. l4l The immediate and
unanimous reply of India Office officials was that
nothing short of necessity should force us to have recourse to such an expedient
which would have the worst effect on our prestige in India ... The employment
of Japanese troops in Persia and Mesopotamia would be only one degree less
objectionable and would probably give rise to embarassing claims by Japan
hereafter.142
However, the Viceroy was prepared in the exigencies of the war to contemplate asking
the Japanese government to provide garrison troops to protect the Suez Canal, an
international waterway, the security of which might appeal to Japanese self-interest.
This would free British troops in Egypt for active service elsewhere.l43
At this point the question was decisively shelved by the major crisis in Ang10-
Japanese relations caused by Japanese attitudes to the Indian seditionists. Despite
this, Lord Curzon revived the question of Japanese assistance in Mesopotamia two
years later, in September 1917, when the collapse of the Russian front appeared
imminent.144
However, in the intervening years the attitude of British Indian officials towards
the question had considerably hardened. For example, the Political Department of
the India Office submitted a memorandum to the Cabinet in May 1916 in which they
argued that India might well become ungovernable after the war unless Turkey was
decisively defeated by Britain alone.
For Great Britain the war with Turkey can never be a side issue. It is, of course,
obvious that by defeating Turkey we have not defeated Germany, whereas if we
succeed in defeating Germany, the collapse of Turkish power follows automatic-
ally. What is less obvious is why this will not suffice for our purpose. Great
Britain is an Asiatic and a Moslem Power, and what makes the war with Turkey
rather a separate war than a mere episode in the world war is the fact that we
are waging it against another Moslem Power with the rest of the Moslem world
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for spectators ... In India itself the vernacular press is loth to believe Russian
victories and loses no opportunities of admiring the feats of Turkish arms. With
all these people we shall have to deal after the war, and live with them on terms
of moral supremacy. We shall have to govern India itself, where besides the Mos-
lem problem, the fact has to be reckoned with that the educated Hindus, though
they have thrown in their lot with us, are not averse to seeing British pride
humbled and humbled by an Asiatic power, and to convince the people of India
that a handful of white men can still control them ... We shall have to face in
the Far East the ambitions and claims of a highly aggressive Japan, who will
reckon thus: the Japanese have beaten the Russians, the Russians have beaten
the Turks, the Turks have beaten the British: ergo ... Until we are in the last
ditch there can be no short cut to peace with Turkey. The war with Turkey was
thrust upon us precisely because the Germans realised its vital importance to us,
and we shall come to serious grief if we attach less importance to it and its
ultimate results than they do.145
The anxiety with which the Government of India regarded Japan after 1905 was
not restricted to questions of comparative diplomatic prestige in Asia. No people were
more acutely aware of the enormous impetus which Japan's victory over Russia gave
to Indian nationalism than the tiny caste of British officials whose authority over
300 millions Indians had stemmed so largely from their own self-confident sense of
superiority and their subjects' resigned acceptance of their inferiority. The charac-
teristic anxiety with which Anglo-Indian officials had regarded every move that Tsarist
Russia made in Asia, they now focussed on the Japanese, whose activities in India
and attitudes towards India they viewed with increasing suspicion. As early as 1906,
according to a history of the Indian nationalist movement written in 1916 by Okawa
Shumei, a leading figure in the Black Dragon Society and perhaps the most active
Japanese supporter of the Indian revolutionaries, a certain Mr. Harada, "a benevolent
Japanese philanthropist who visited India ... to attend a meeting of the Young Men's
Christian Association" received undignified treatment from Indian Government
officials because he was suspected of having come to India to advocate Indian
independence.146 This was the forerunner of a series of analogous incidents. Two
which became diplomatic issues were the restrictions placed on the movements of
Count Otani and Baron Kujo, who visited India in January 1916,147 and the expulsion
from India in early 1919 ofProfessor Kanokogi Kazunobu, who had gone there in the
summer of 1918 ostensibly to study Indian philosophy. Since Kanokogi was known
as a Pan-Asianist sympathetic with the objects of the Indian revolutionaries, the
Government of India expelled him from the country on the grounds that he had
entered Nepal without waiting for permission to cross the frontier.148
Although some weight should be given to the Government ofIndia's continual re-
buttals ofJapanese charges ofoffensive and humiliating treatment ofJapanese nationals
in India-for the status-conscious Japanese were clearly as oversensitive as the Anglo-
Indian officials were over-suspicious-it is clear from the Indian administration's own .
documents that Japanese were not only subjected to special surveillance but that this
was inexpert and clumsy. The Viceroy reported to the Secretary of State for India
Shortly before the beginning of the war, we very carefully considered the question
of initiating a system of contre-espionage on the Japanese in India, and although
we had ample reason to believe that there was considerable prying or spying on
the part of Japanese nationals we decided against this course for the following
main reasons:
(a) We did not think we could find agents who understood the Japanese suffi-
ciently to keep an efficient watch on them;
(b) We anticipated that an efficient system of watch on the Japanese in India
would be irritating and harmful and likely to bring about incidents which
would further strain the relations between the two governments; and
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(c) We considered that a wiser course was to start on higher ground than mere
counter-espionage by keeping in touch with the political and commercial
happenings in Japan through information supplied to us by His Britannic
Majesty's Ambassador at Tokyo, by a careful examination of the Japanese
press and other means.149
This, no doubt, would have been an excellent policy if the alternatives to the crea-
tion of an efficient counter-espionage system in India had not included the intensifica-
tion of inexpert police surveillance, which often resulted in the very sort of incidents
the administration was seeking to avoid. What made ordinary police methods more
unsatisfactory was the discriminatory way in which they were applied to the Subjects
of Britain's Far Eastern ally. For example, in December 1909, the Japanese Govern-
ment caused some embarrassment in London by complaining that Japanese residents
in India were not treated comparably with European or American residents and by
asking that all causes of discrimination (in particular the non-exemption of Japanese
from the provisions of the Indian Arms Act) be removed. In its reply the British govern-
ment believed it had made "a very strong case for adhering to existing practice" since
the Japanese government did not pursue the matter.150
Some of the difficulties in which the Government of India found itself in its
attempts to keep itself informed about Japanese activities arose from a parsimony,
\\hich was no doubt appropriate to the poverty of India but was quite inconsistent
either with the salary scales of the Indian Civil Service or the enormous British stake
in India which they believed to be threatened by the Japanese. On the other hand a
jealous fear of interference by home government departments in Indian affairs pre-
vented it from making the best use of their specialist services. Until the events of 1915
proved otherwise, the Government of India minimised accumulating evidence from
the British consular service that the Indian revolutionary conspiracies could not be
effectively countered within the boundaries of India. l5l When they did realise the
necessity of dealing with the problem through an interdepartmental organisation in
co-operation with the Foreign Office, War Office, Colonial Office and Admiralty, the
Indian administration rarely took a generous view of the proportion of the costs it
should bear. An Indian merchant residing in Yokohama, who was employed by the
British consulate in the dangerous work of spying among the Indian revolutionaries
in Japan and the Philippines, during two years received only a honorarium of £10
from the Government of India, until Greene's protests extracted aOother £15n.152
The Government of India also haggled about their share of the £15,000 paid to the
German Secret Service agent, George Vincent Kraft, whose information and services
more than any other factor caused all the German-supported conspiracies of 1915 to
abort, thereby saving the Indian administration from enormous trouble and expense
and considerable bloodshed.l53 When, in the light of wartime experiences, the Delhi
Government decided in 1921 to establish a division of Japanese affairs within its
external affairs department (the Political and Foreign Department) they coolly
suggested that F. Ashton-Gwatkin, the Foreign Office's principal Japanese expert,
might be seconded to the Indian Civil Service to launch the new venture.154 On being
offered a more junior officer from the Japan consular service, they dropped the whole
scheme, rather than pay a salary adequate to effect the transfer.155
Nevertheless, British India as a quasi-dominion did go a great deal further than
Australia, for example, towards the goal of acquiring an independent source of in-
formation about Japanese affairs and an independent means of assessing this in its
own interests. Like Australia, India asked the British Embassy to forward in transla-
tion all items in the Japanese press directly affecting its own interests ;156 but the Indian
administration went a step beyond this by attracting from commercial employment
Captain A. Cardew, a Japanese-speaking ex-army officer, with a Japanese wife, as a
special adviser on Japanese affairs. 15? Moreover, the exigencies of the situation required
direct communication between the Tokyo Embassy arid the Viceroy; and the appoint-
ment in December 1915 of David Petrie of the Indian Criminal Intelligence Depart-
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ment to head the new inter-departmental intelligence service created to deal with
enemy and nationalist conspiracies in the Far East ensured that little of importance
was withheld from the Government of India by home government departments.158
The Indian submissions of 1916 were therefore well-informed and well-documented
and certainly merited the serious consideration they received in the Foreign Office.
8. THE 1916 REAPPRAISAL OF BRITISH FAR EASTERN POLICY
The essence of the Home Government's reappraisal of Great Britain's position
in the Far East can be found in the Foreign Office commentaries on two papers which
Austen Chamberlain, as Secretary of State for India, submitted to Cabinet in May 1916
as one document. The first, entitled Japanese Activities in China and India, had been
drawn up by the General Staff, and the second, entitled Japanese Policy and Its
Bearing on India,159 had been prepared by the India Office. In a lucid analysis, accom-
panying the General Staff Memorandum, John Duncan Gregory, head of the Far
Eastern Department, 1916-17, restated in a more drastic form the doctrine which, as
Pelcovits has shown, underlay British China policy in the second half of the nineteenth
century.
The integrity and liberty of China is necessary to us on account of the enormous
industrial and financial stake which we possess in the country. But in an emergency
we could part with all that as incommensurate with the vital issues for which we
are prosecuting the war. Ofall our world commitments they are relatively the least
important, and we could part with them without courting Imperial disaster.
Gregory continued, in what was to prove the decisive proviso,
But if the breakup of China and the ensuing intervention of Japan constitutes the
danger to India just indicated then it may eventually become necessary to revolu-
tionise our whole Far Eastern policy by means and with what consequences it is
impossible to contemplate at this moment without dismay.16O
On the second memorandum, Sir Eric Drummond, Grey's private secretary and
later General Secretary of the League of Nations, penned his dissent from this
pessimistic view.
I believe that the danger that Japan will ever make China a great military nation
is a very doubtful one. It seems to me more likely that Chinese passive resistance
will absorb Japanese restlessness. As regards peaceful economic penetration of
China by Japan, I doubt whether we should be wise to resist it even if we could.
{(we desire to keep on good terms with Japan we must allow her to expand some-
where and China is the one safe place.
Against this annotation, Grey significantly minuted: "I hold much the same view".~61
However Grey's view that the danger to India lay not in a graceful accommoda-
tion of Japan's aspirations in China but in resistance to them, did not prevail with the
powerful Conservative ministers in the two coalition governments. Lord Robert Cecil,
Minister for the Blockade, 1916-18, and acting Foreign Secretary during his cousin
Balfour's numerous absences from the Foreign Office, was not contradicted when he
advised the Cabinet in May 1917 that
it might be possible to gain Japanese assent to our (proposed) alliance with the
United States by adopting Lord Grey's policy of giving Japan a free hand over
the whole of China ... but he personally deprecated this as involving serious
dangers to India and to our position generally.162
A much fuller statement of this decision had already been conveyed to Greene
in a crucial despatch from Balfour on 13 February 1917. Largely penned by Gregory,
with a final editing by Sir Walter Langley, the document was annotated by Greene as
290 DON DIGNAN
"the first exposition of government policy" he had seen since his arrival in Tokyo in
1913.163
A general agreement with the Japanese Government about their aims in China
has been ruled out as impracticable and dangerous, and so His Majesty's Govern-
ment are thrown back on the consideration on its merits of each fresh case as it
arises ... The policy of His Majesty's Government towards such measures as
Japan has thought fit to take has, as Your Excellency is aware, been one of forced
acquiescence-not to obstruct and yet not to offer any concession gratuitously.
But notwithstanding an accommodating attitude in the loan and kindred ques-
tions, His Majesty's Government are quietly resisting attempts from various
quarters to allow the Japanese to get a footing in the industrial undertakings in
China in those preserves where their exclusion is considered essential to British
political interests, primarily in the provinces bordering India and Thibet, and in
the Yangtse Valley Any other policy towards Japan at the moment is clearly
out of the question it may indeed be practicable, as Your Excellency suggests,
and the Secretary of State for India notices with hope, to safeguard the require-
ments of India in Thibet and the border provinces without any sacrifice of British
interests elsewhere in the Chinese Empire. But, whatever the relative weakness
of Japan may be, it is doubtful in the present condition of British political and
financial helplessness in the Far East, that His Majesty's Government are secure
enough to maintain the existing state of things against any pressure that may
suddenly arise. Moreover, it must be realised that, should it be necessary at any
time to ask for military and even largely increased naval favours from the
Japanese, the price that would have to be paid could only be-as far as it is
possible to see-at the expense of British interests in China.
It must indeed be a cardinal point in British policy that, in an extreme case,
concessions to Japan could be looked for only in this direction, and not in the
direction of India. On this point there can be no compromise, and it is important
that no hopes should be held out to Japan of concessions by India, for India will
not grant them ... So long as the war lasts ... it clearly behoves British policy
to steer with the greatest care through the various cross-currents in which the
interests of this country, India and Japan are involved. Questions containing the
germs of controversy and friction must be avoided so far as is consistent with the
requirements of this country for the effective conduct of the war. But at its close
it will be without doubt necessary to arrive at distinct understandings as to our
own and Japanese interests in the Far East,164
It was in this spirit of typical British pragmatism that Sir Louis Mallet's C.I.D.
sub-committee on territorial changes recommended only that Japan should be assured
of diplomatic support in her claims in Shantung and the Northern Pacific ;165 and the (
British employed their diplomacy not, as Sir Edward Grey envisaged, in a spirit of
sympathy towards Japan's problems but to resist or to concede to Japanese encroach-
ments on British imperial interests point by point.
Thus the reappraisal of 1916 led to no major change in the outward character of
British Far Eastern policy; but the spirit of Anglo-Japanese relations had been
drastically changed by the events of late 1915 and early 1916. Certainly the British
Cabinet continued to think of their Japanese ally largely in terms of the spirit of the
alliance and remained optimistic that full-scale Japanese intervention in the war could
be achieved if only the Allies could present Japan with a suitable role calculated to
appeal to the Japanese public-a self-interested illusion which laid the foundations
for the essentially British scheme for massive Japanese intervention in Siberia in early
1918.166 However, the departmental officers charged with dealing with Japan became
steadily more antagonistic towards the Japanese. The image of loyal Anglo-Japanese
co-operation, sedulously fostered in England by the vigorous press censorship and an
unprecedented propaganda campaign-efforts which Lord Northcliffe, who was
BRITISH FAR EASTERN POLICY 1913-19 291
officially responsible for propaganda to the enemy, unofficially supported through his
mass circulation Daily Mail and through the Times--was a hypocrisy which Jordan,
Greene, and the Far Eastern Department found hard to stomach.
Within the Foreign Office and the India Office officials followed up Crowe's idea
of using Japan's economic vulnerability as a weapon to bring her to heel. In Tokyo,
although Greene pursued a normal pattern of relations with the Minister of Foreign
Affairs as the legitimate and formal spokesman of Japanese policy, a considerable
effort was now initiated to make contact with the realities of Japanese political life
beneath the Westernised constitutional surface. David Petrie, who had been seconded
from the Indian Criminal Intelligence Department to head a newly organised inter-
departmental intelligence service for the Far East, was sent to Japan in July 1916 to
assist the British vice-consul at Yokohama, C. J. Davidson,167 one of the ablest and
most resourceful Japanese linguists in the service, to build up an intelligence network
in Japan. This was initiated with the appointment ofIndian agents to work amongst
the Indian revolutionaries in Japan and their Japanese supporters but was expanded
to employ Japanese agents to make contact with people as highly placed as Baron
Goto Shimpei, Minister for the Interior and later Foreign Minister in the Terauchi
Government. By January 1918 Greene was calling for a secret service fund large enough
to attract first rate agents of Japanese nationality and to provide them with the expense
accounts needed to soften up their contacts with lavish dinners and geishas.168 With
singular industry Davidson also undertook the work of supplying the Foreign Office
with extensive precis translations of nationalist literature.
The Embassy's newly created secret service was not only successful in supplying
the Foreign Office with the information on which to make far better informed calcula-
tions of Japanese policies, but it circumscribed the activities of the Indian revolution-
aries so well as to progressively neutralise them. Toyama Mitsuru, inspired, perhaps,
by his own familiarity with extra-legal expedients,appears to have been convinced that
British agents might assassinate or kidnap the revolutionary leaders wanted by the
Government ofIndia. To avoid this fate, or more probably to evade British surveillance
and help maintain the fiction that only his unknown whereabouts prevented his arrest
by the Japanese police, Bose changed his retreat seventeen times between November
1915 and July 1923, when he was granted naturalisation as a Japanese citizen.169
High officials of the Japanese Ministry of the Interior were sufficiently em-
barrassed by the secret British activities to threaten Davidson's Japanese agents when
they were discovered, and to obstruct their work.170 On the other hand, with charac-
teristic ambivalence, these high officials appear to have found the British agents a
useful channel for attempting to assure the British that the police protection which
Rash Behari Bose appeared to enjoy was in reality surveillance and that the Japanese
government, far from underwriting Toyama, were attempting to keep a watch on his
liaison with the Indian revolutionaries without coming into direct conflict with him.17l
These secret British operations in Japan were not without their ludicrous aspects.
In the approved style, Petrie's first two Indian agents, code-named P and Q, were
ignorant of each other's true position, with the result that Q spent a great deal of his
early time spying on P, finally taking up residence with him in order to observe his
apparently seditious activities more closely.172
9. POST-WAR PERSPECTIVES ON THE WARTIME INDIAN
QUESTIONS
Even under the direction of the German Foreign Office and with substantial
financial backing from the same source, the ill-organised Indian revolutionary con-
spiracies were thrown into confusion once a systematic and world-wide intelligence
system was created to combat them. British consular orcolonial officials in countries
with a significant Indian community kept a close watch on inward and outward bound
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Indian passengers, and in this way a great many conspirators were identified, questioned
and arrested as their ships passed through Singapore and Hong Kong. In addition to
their great breaks in 1915 when George Vincent Kraft en route from Berlin to Batavia
arranged his own arrest at Singapore in order to sell his services to the Britishl73 and
the similar defection to the consul-general in Batavia of a less important German
agent code-named "Oren", British intelligence succeeded in infiltrating agents into
the conspirators' ranks--even into the relevant section of the German Foreign Office,
and they were about to infiltrate the German Legation in Peking when China's
diplomatic rupture with Germany in March 1917 forestalled the necessity.174
Mter the failures of 1915, the German Foreign Office, according to the reports
of British agents, reached the conclusion that a rebellion in India could not be sparked
off without extensive Japanese assistance. Thus after their failure in 1916 to purchase
Japan's withdrawal from the war directly, the Germans concentrated on trying to
secure official Japanese support for the growing assistance which the Japanese
nationalists were already giving to the Indian revolutionaries and to co-ordinate this
with the general schemes engineered by the Indian committee in Berlin. To further
these aims they sent Taraknath Das, perhaps the ablest publicist among the revolu-
tionaries, from Berlin to the Far East in mid 1916. Taraknath Das was no stranger to
Japan having studied there in 1905-6 after fleeing from India; and despite the efforts
of British diplomacy he had subsequently acquired a valuable shield for his revolu-
tionary activities by successfully seeking naturalisation as an American citizen,175
Although he did not achieve the principal aim of his Far Eastern mission of 1916-17,
he was much more successful than his colleagues in presenting the Indian revolutionary
cause in the context of Japan's national interests. One of his pamphlets, The Isolation
of Japan in World Politics, which was translated into Japanese by Okawa Shumei,
made such an impact, particularly on high-ranking Japanese officers, that the govern-
ment officially suppressed it, yet failed to prevent it being distributed privatelyy6
Taraknath Das also established more direct relations with the governing elite of Japan
than had the resident Indian revolutionaries who had been obliged to work through
intermediaries like Okawa and Toyama.
Despite this, most Japanese who were nominally responsible for the direction of
Japanese policy were most careful not to become enmeshed in the German-directed
schemes and careful to tolerate or encourage Japanese support for the Indian revolu-
tionaries at an unofficial level only. Not only did the Japanese Ministry of Foreign
Affairs frequently promise Greene remedial action (which, however, never material-
ised) but Davidson's agents were unable to draw from Japanese statesmen more than
expressions of sympathy for the Indian nationalist cause and assurances of good
offices on a long term basis. British Indian agents failed to establish that the Marquis
Okuma did more than acquiesce in the pressure put on him by Toyama and Inukai
to save Bose, while "Panax", one of Davidson's agents of Japanese nationality,
elicited only annoyance from Baron Goto Shimpei when he tried to sound him on the
subject of Indian independence. Goto sharply rebuked "Panax" for a foolish interest
in the activities of the Indians, for whom the Minister expressed contempt, saying
that the German-supported schemes would all come to naught since the Government
of India had the situation well in handY7
Combined with a cautious reluctance to become committed to a nationalist move-
ment for which neither the diplomatic situation nor domestic Indian conditions
augured well for direct Japanese initiative at this stage was a growing apprehension
of the effect that the anarchistic ideas of the Indian revolutionaries might have on their
Japanese supporters. For a motive not discoverable to Davidson, Agent "P" was
approached by a man who identified himself as a Japanese Secret Service agent (but
gave no indication of whether he believed "P" to be a disaffected Indian or knew his
real role) and told him that the Japanese government had become greatly concerned
that Toyama's association with socialistic-anarchistic elements in the Indian revolu-
tionary party might have dangerous repercussions in Japan itself.178
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Yet despite these crosscurrents in official attitudes to the Indian revolutionaries,
the Japanese Government found itself in 1919 unable to sacrifice the life of Rash
Behari Bose even to avert an unequivocal threat by the Government of India of
economic retaliation. Of course the Japanese may well have calculated that in the not
too distant future the Indian administration would enact discriminatory legislation
against Japanese commerce, whether Bose were surrendered or not, in which case
acquiescence in the British demand would be a useless sacrifice. Nevertheless, in a
diplomatic situation where Japan was now far more enthusiastic about renewing the
Anglo-JapaneSe Alliance than was Great Britain, the Japanese Government was much
more troubled py the renewed British demand than they had been during the war.
In fact, in January 1919 a British agent of Japanese nationality, code-named A.15,
was approached by a high official of the metropolitan police named Oshio, whose duty
it was to watch over foreigners, and asked what the Government of India reward for
the surrender of Bose was. A.l5 said that it was 8,000 yen (£800), which was payable
only if Bose were handed over to competent British officials in the British dominions
or in China. Oshio said that it would be difficult to arrange rendition but possible if
some British official gave a guarantee that the reward would be paid, and he asked for
a down payment immediately.179 A few days later he presented a concrete demand for
100,000 yen (£10,000) to keep A.15 fully informed of the doings of Rash Behari Bose
and of his friends and also supply copies of correspondence. He added that he would
not undertake to do this for a smaller sum as it would involve him in great personal
danger and might at any time necessitate his leaving Japan for good; and he repeated
that the question of the rendition of Bose was a far more serious matter than A.l5
supposed.180 A few days later the British commercial attache was visited at his home
by Oshio's younger brother, "a dissolute and somewhat disreputable person who
claimed to have been educated at Eton and Cambridge and spoke English with great
fluency."18I He repeated his brother's offer and "remarked somewhat inconsequently
but very significantly that he himself was very well acquainted with both the Marquis
Okuma and Baron GotO."182
From these negotiations it would appear that the extradition of Bose might have
been effected on an unofficial basis for a very large sum of money--more than the British
were willing to pay. If in this case the British had any ethical objections to securing
Bose through irregular channels, they had certainly had no such scruples in 1916 when
Sir Edward Grey had authorised an attempt by the China consular service to kidnap
Bhaghwan Singh from within the quasi-neutral Austrian concession in Tientsin:
"I leave it entirely to your discretion whether it is safe to embark on any form of
kidnapping enterprise."183
In 1919, however, the surrender of Bose had become less important in itself than
as a symbolic gesture of Japanese repudiation of the Indian revolutionary cause and
repentance for their wartime attitudes.
For their part the Japanese Government completely dropped the pretence they
had maintained for three years since Bose and Gupta first disappeared into Toyama's
house in 1915 while the police charged with carrying out a deportation order waited
outside either through great awe of Toyama or, as later reported by British Indian
agents, because of a secret instruction from the Premier, Marquis Okuma.184 Now,
in 1919, the Japanese Ministry of Foreign Affairs, with apparent candour, insisted
that although Bose was a great embarrassment to the Government, his delivery to a
British executioner would place senior Japanese statesmen and officials in great danger
of assassination by Toyama's henchmen.185 Such an extraordinary admission of the
unconstitutional power of a ruthless nationalist leader was regarded somewhat
sceptically by the British. Though willing to admit that Toyama's society would stop
at nothing, their own information led them to believe that the society's support had
been so undermined by post-war conditions that they could be persuaded by a suffic-
iently large firumcial inducement from the Japanese Government to sell out their
Indian proteges. In support of this view was the statement made in August 1918 by
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N. Oshima,· Director of the Secretariat of the Superintendent-General of the
Metropolitan Police, to British agent A.5. Oshima said that the Shina RoninI86 were
not by any means the most important factor in this question, as they could always be
squared by the payment of a few thousand yen to Toyama Mitsuru, Uchida Ryohei,
and a few others. The real difficulty, he said, lay in the fact that a certain section of
the Government as well as a number of influential persons outside the Government,
were strongly of the opinion that Japan's best interests would not be served in the
long run by deporting Rash Behari. On the other hand, he added, there was a
strong party both in the government and outside who were convinced that Japan was
making a great mistake in protecting him in defiance of the order of deportation which
was still in force against him.18? Since this statement was so consistent with the whole
wartime record of official equivocation on the Indian seditionist issue, the British
could only suppose that many senior Japanese statesmen and officials were afraid of
the incriminating revelations Bose might make in revenge if he were brought to trial
in India. In fact, Davidson believed that high-ranking Japanese whom Bose might
implicate would probably arrange to have him murdered if the Japanese Government
did not resist the British pressure for his extradition.l88
At all events Toyama, who had arranged Bose's marriage in 1918 to Soma Toshi-
ko, daughter of Soma Aizo, who had originally concealed the fugitive in the 10ft of
his bakery, secured the would-be assassin of Viceroy Hardinge Japanese citizenship
in 1922.189 In growing isolation from the main stream ofIndian history, Bose remained
in Japan for the rest of an increasingly frustrated life, brightened only at its close by
his figurehead status in the Japanese sponsored Indian National Liberation Army.1 90
Although the Government of India thus failed to secure what Greene and then
Alston in Tokyo were instructed to regard as a major objective of British policy, they
nevertheless did secure in the short run the objectives of which the desired extradition
of Bose had become more symbolic than important in itself. Despite the fresh wave
of unrest in India, the Korean rebellion and American support for Chinese nationalism
so turned the tables on the Japanese that their ambassador in London felt obliged in
1919 to suffer what amounted to a series of condescending lectures from the imperious
Lord Curzon, during which the Foreign Secretary warned that if Japanese policies in
Korea were not moderated the British government would find it impossible to prevent
an outburst of public hostility towards Japan in Great Britain.l9l In these circum-
stances it is not surprising that the hitherto copious Foreign Office files on Japanese
relations with the Indian seditionists dwindled to a few pages in the early nineteen
twenties.192 However, as part of a tacit bargain with Japan, the Foreign Office made it
plain to English sympathisers that the question of Korean independence had been
settled finally in 1910 and that the activities of Syngman Rhee and the expatriate
Korean nationalists would meet with official British discouragement.
As a result the Government of India's day of reckoning with Japan, anticipated
from the early days of 1916, did not materialise. Not only did the Government ofIndia
find it unnecessary to contemplate economic warfare with Japan because of vastly
improved Japanese policies towards the Indian revolutionaries, but it was able to use
Japan's failure to surrender Bose as an excuse for restrictive legislation aimed at halting
Japanese economic penetration of India. Although this was thinly disguised as a
measure against all foreign ownership of Indian resources, the threats of Greene and
Alston must have left the Japanese in no doubt that the restrictions were directed
against them.
What is· most significant about the Anglo-Indian attitude to Japanese· inroads
into the Indian economy is that Japanese competition was resented as soon as it made
a small dint in the virtual British monopoly. When the statistics with which the Gov-
ernment ofIndia supported their plaintiff memorandum of March 1916 are examined,
it is found that Japan's percentage of India's import trade rose from 2.6 per cent in
1913-14 to 5.6 per cent in 1915-16, while that of the British Empire fell almost in
correspondence from 74.4 per cent to 70.6 per cent. Although the more detailed figures
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show that some British firms and some industries were affected more severely than the
general index suggests, nevertheless it is clear that the British strongly resented losing
even a small share of their Indian preserve. In the shipping trade, where the British
complaint about Japan was loudest, the statistics in the sequel memorandum of 1919
show the real British grievance to be that "while in 1912-13 less than one half of the
trade between India and Japan was carried in Japanese bottoms ... by 1918-1919 more
than 85 per cent of the trade with Japan was carried by Japanese vessels."193 The fact
that Japan's proportion of the sea carriage between India and countries other than
Japan rose from about one fifth of one per cent in 1912-13 to something like 6 per cent
in 1918-19 moved the Government ofIndia to complain that "they have also secured
a very firm hold on the trade between India and other countries."194
Aware, no doubt, that their supporting statistics scarcely bore the complexion of
their general observations, the Government of India laid their main stress on the
political implications of Japanese economic expansion into the Indian sphere:
Apart from the purely industrial issue we cannot regard it as other than un-
desirable that the Japanese should establish themselves on any large scale in this
country. In fact to the political aspect of the question we attach the utmost
importance. The prestige of Japan is great and her ambitions unbounded. A
systematic commercial penetration may well be the precursor of wider schemes,
the execution of which may not be imminent, but against which it is well to be
forewarned. Her national design is to dominate the East and whatever be the
sentiments of Indians towards her at the moment, the role of champion of the
East against the West is sure to evoke a response in an Oriental country. We have
had recent instances of the Indian revolutionary party counting on Japanese
sympathy, and apparently not altogether in vain. For the acquisition of a strong
commercial footing as a preliminary in the exercise of political influence there are
many precedents, and in a country like India it is far easier for the Japanese to
pursue their machinations unnoticed than it would be for any European power;195
This was written in March 1916 before the full story of Japan's relations with the
Indian revolutionaries had unfolded. Naturally the memorandum of December 1919
laid even greater stress on political factors:
... side by side with these developments there has sprung up in India a growing
Japanese population. The political importance of these results cannot be over~
estimated. The number of Japanese nationals in India may be insignificant among
a population of over three hundred millions, but to ignore them on this ground
would imply neglect of the lessons of the past.196
Justified by the Japanese Government's refusal to surrender Bose even under
threats of Indian retaliation, the Government of India initiated legislation which
would enable them to
preclude foreigners except under licence from acquiring the ownership of any
immoveable property or any interest therein conferring a title to possession of
for a period exceeding seven years.197
Although the legislation was non-discriminatory in the sense that it embraced all
foreigners, India Office and Foreign Office documents made it quite plain that it was
directed specifically against the Japanese:
... It is beyond question that the Japanese are making deliberate efforts to
capture the trade of southern India and also to establish their own industri"es in
this country. To fulfil this object they will be obliged to obtain a permanent foot-
ing in the country by acquiring land. We have thus been led to consider not only
whether the Japanese should be allowed to develop their plans for exploiting the
resources of India for the benefit of their own nation, but also whether there are
not political objections to their obtaining a permanent footing in the country by
acquiring land without restriction. The policy pursued by the Germans in Turkey,
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Russia and elsewhere before the war has shown how it is possible for a foreign
people to exploit the resources of a country of which they have not the political
control. In India it is obvious that dangers might arise in the event of an outbreak
of war if important minerals such as coal and oil were controlled by aliens.
There is also, in our opinion, a certain risk that settlements established primarily
for trade may become centres of anti-British or seditious propaganda and possible
rallying points for the disaffected in the case of serious internal disorder. The
presence of increasing numbers of Japanese settlements in India, even ifnot agree-
able to Indian opinion itself, may at least be expected to encourage the sentiment
of Asia for the Asiatic, and to that extent strengthen the opposition to the British
government in India. We have indeed recently received some information, though
not of a very definite character, that certain Japanese residents in southern India
are spreading anti-British propaganda among Indians and making little secret
of the fact that their purchases of land are a cloak to their policy of acquiring
control of this country ...
There is evidence that the Japanese are collecting detailed information
regarding certain of our ports which would be useful for the purpose of naval
intelligence, and it is not impossible that they will attempt to establish themselves
permanently at strategic points along our coast and in the neighbourhood of our
coaling stations .. ,198
It can never be known whether less obstructive policies towards Japanese econo-
mic expansion into areas of Asia where Britain had longstanding and prior vested
interests would have modified or encouraged the Japanese attitude that British
political control was choking Japan's economic growth. However, it is clear that the
policy of the Government of India considered above was also the policy of the British
administration in Malaya, which enacted wartime regulations to prevent Japanese
investors buying Malayan rubber plantations at a time when British capital had to be
channelled into war purposes ;199 and indeed a good deal of the British enthusiasm for
the independence and territorial integrity of China arose from the fact that British
interests were so firmly entrenched in the status quo as to give them a kind of quasi-
protection against newer commercial competitors. Under these circumstances, it was
inevitable that the feeling should spread in Japan that the destruction of British
imperialism in Asia was essential. This sentiment was nicely expressed in a booklet
written in 1916 by Okawa Shumei and distributed among the Japanese governing
elite. Its first chapter was devoted to an attack on British India's policy towards
Japanese commerce and Japanese visitors; and its title was prophetic: Japan and
England Must Collide. 20o
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BIOGRAPHICAL APPENDIX
This appendix is not intended to be a comprehensive biographical gazetteer of all
persons mentioned in the text. It simply incorporates some background material
which could not be incorporated in the main body of the paper but was conveniently
separable from the mass of reference footnotes.
ASHTON-GWATKIN, Frank Trelawney Arthur (b. 1889) began his career as a
student interpreter in the Japan consular service in 1913. Rising in the service during
the war years, he was seconded in April 1918 to the intelligence division of the G.O.C.
Singapore to investigate Japanese activities in Malaya. After a further period as a
language officer in Japan, he returned to the Foreign Office to assist in the preparations
for a Far Eastern settlement, in which capacity he was the author of a great many of
the memoranda on all aspects of Far Eastern questions which the Foreign Office
prepared in 1920-21. He accompanied Balfour to Washington in October 1921 as the
British specialist on Japan.
CROWE, E. T. F. (b. 1877) began his career as a student interpreter in the consular
service in Japan in 1897, becoming commercial attache at the Embassy in 1906 and
commercial counsellor in 1918.
ELIOT, Sir Charles Norman Edgecumbe (1862-1931), after a varied career in the
diplomatic service from 1887 to 1904, resigned to become Vice-Chancellor of the new
University of Sheffield, 1905-11, and the new University of Hong Kong, 1912-18.
He was a linguist and orientalist of considerable distinction. His most important work
was a three volume study of Hinduism and Buddhism published in 1921, and he spent
part of his relatively quiet term as Ambassador in Tokyo from 1920-26 collecting
material for his standard study Japanese Buddhism, published posthumously in
1935. Since he had not experienced the great difficulties in Anglo-Japanese relations
from 1913 to 1918 and was known to be well disposed towards the Japanese, Balfour
recalled him from retirement in the Spring of 1918 to undertake the delicate task of
coordinating Anglo-Japanese policies in Siberia as British High Commissioner in
Vladivostock. Jordan reported "as a strange trait of his character" that on receiving
the news while he was on a visit to Peking of his appointment to this position, "he
went the same afternoon to the Temple of Heaven to return thanks" (Jordan to
Langley, private letter of 14 August 1918; F.O. 350/16). Of all British officials involved
in post-war Anglo-Japanese relations Eliot was clearly the most sympathetic towards
the Japanese and appears to have been appointed to the Tokyo Embassy in 1920 for
this reason. This enabled the Foreign Secretary, Lord Curzon, to present Eliot's views
on the renewal of the Anglo-Japanese Alliance to Cabinet in May 1921, and to the
Imperial Conference in June 1921, as Foreign Office specialist opinion, whereas Eliot
appears to have been the only Foreign service official with specialist experience of
Far Eastern affairs who thoroughly supported the Cabinet line.
JORDAN, Sir John Newell (1852-1925) began his long Far Eastern career as a student
interpreter in the China consular service in 1876. From 1896 to 1906 he was succes-
sively Consul-general, Charge d'affaires, and Minister in Seoul. From 1906 to 1920,
when he retired, he was Minister in Peking. He emerged from retirement in 1922 to
make his incomparable expertise available to the British Empire delegation at the
Washington Conference.
MACLEAY, Sir James William Ronald (1870-1943) had a typical foreign service
career in other parts of the world until he was appointed Counsellor at the Peking
Legation in February 1914. In September 1916 he was brought back to London to
head the Foreign Office's Far Eastern Department. He was Foreign Secretary Balfour's
principal Far Eastern expert at the Versailles Peace Conference in 1919. After two
years as Minister to the Argentine 1920-22, he returned to the Peking Legation as
Minister (1922-26).
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OKAWA, Shumei (1886-1957) later ranked with Kita Ikki as one of the most in-
fluential radical nationalists of the inter-war period. His political career is described
in R. Storry, The Double Patriots: A Study ofJapanese Nationalism (London, 1957).
REINSCH, Paul Samuel (1869-1923) was born in Milwaukee, Wisconsin. He received
a Ph.D. from the University of Wisconsin in 1898, and held the position of Lecturer
in Political Science there from 1898 to 1913. He lectured at the Universities of Leipzig
and Berlin in 1911 and 1912. He was Minister to China from 1913 to 1919.
TOYAMA, Mitsuru (1855-1944). The political career of this supremely important
Japanese nationalist cannot be captured adequately in biographical detail because of
its peculiarly Japanese backstage character. Probably the best account to date in
English is in M. Jansen, The Japanese and Sun Yat Sen.
WELLESLEY, Victor Alexander Augustus Henry (b. 1876) had had a desk career in
the Foreign Office and had never served in the Far East. Nevertheless his former
position as Controller of Commercial and Consular Affairs had kept him continuously
briefed on developments in China.
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